# JRTC TRENDS COMPENDIUM

**No. 98-7** **APR 98**

**4QFY96 through 3QFY97**

***A Collection of Trends, with Techniques and Procedures that Work!***


**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)**
**U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)**
**FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**

**Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)**

# TRENDS COMPENDIUM
# 4QFY96 through 3QFY97

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# JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER
# TRENDS COMPENDIUM
# 4QFY96 through 3QFY97

***JRTC Priority Trends*** is a compilation of recurring (priority) **positive** and **needs emphasis** JRTC trends and associated techniques and procedures. Extracted from CALL's CTC Trends for JRTC, this publication is second in a new series of such compilations and covers one year (four quarters) of JRTC trends (4QFY96, 1, 2 & 3QFY97).

***JRTC Priority Trends*** highlights **positive** and **needs emphasis** trends that appear **more than once** in all CTC Trends for JRTC during the period covered (in this case, four quarters). (Note: refer to the Trends Frequency Matrix.) The trends are listed in order of priority, based on the number of times they were repeated. It is important to note that these trends and recommended techniques and procedures are a compilation of quarterly **JRTC observer/controller (O/C)-derived observations**. These trends are not based on CALL statistical studies or analyses.

***JRTC Priority Trends*** and associated techniques are listed by Battlefield Operating System (BOS), and are grouped into major sections as shown:

Section A - Priority Trends Matrix Summary
Section P - Positive Performance Trends and TTPs
Section N - Needs Emphasis Trends and TTPs

Section A is a matrix chart of all the priority trends within their respective BOS. The chart shows the number of times per quarter an O/C documented that particular trend/observation. This matrix covers a period of 11 quarters, with a vertical line indicating the last four quarters specifically addressed in this compendium.

EXAMPLE: (from page A-1)

**TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE**

| | | | 4Q95 | | 4Q96 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ` | 123Q95 | 1Q96 | 2-3Q96 | 1Q97 | 2-3Q97 |
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and application | X | X | X[2] | X | X |

In this example, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and application** is a "Positive Trend 1" under TA.5 Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS). This means it was reported more times in the last 11 quarters than any other TA.5 positive trend, and is, therefore, the number one priority. It was reported six times in the last 11 quarters (one in 1-2-3QFY95; one in 4QFY95/1QFY96; two in 2-3QFY96; one in 4QFY96/1QFY97; one in 2-3QFY97). Battlefield Operating System (BOS) codes, i.e., "TA.5 Intelligence," are based on TRADOC Pam 11-9, ***Blueprint of the Battlefield***. "TA" refers to the tactical level of war. The number "5" is the Intelligence BOS number.

Sections P and N contain the **positive and needs emphasis trends** as they were published in CTC Trends for JRTC during the last eight quarters. A summary of the recommended **techniques** for all observations pertaining to a single priority trend appears immediately following the observations for that trend. The techniques for each priority trend are compiled from the O/Cs' recommendations to improve battlefield performance. Some are intended for implementation during mission execution. Others are meant to be trained at Home Station.

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**JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER**
**TRENDS FREQUENCY MATRIX**
**1QFY95 through 3QFY97**

| TA.5 INTELLIGENCE | | 4Q95 | | | 4Q96 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 123Q95 | 1Q96 | 2-3Q96 | 1Q97 | 2-3Q97 |
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and application | X | X | $X^2$ | X | X |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and application | X | $X^2$ | $X^2$ | X | X |
| 2. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan development | | $X^3$ | $X^2$ | $X^2$ | |
| 3. S-2 analysis and reporting | | $X^3$ | X | | X |
| 4. Effective use of assets | | $X^3$ | | | $X^2$ |

| TA.1 MANEUVER | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. Use of Night Observation Devices (NODs) | X | | $X^2$ | X | X |
| 2. Soldier load | | X | X | X | |
| 3. Movement formations and techniques | $X^2$ | | | | X |
| 4. Battle drills | X | X | | | |
| 5. Aircrew coord/task execution | X | X | | | |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Direct fire planning | $X^2$ | X | X | X | |
| 2. Actions on contact | $X^2$ | | | | X |
| 3. Force protection | X | | | X | |
| 4. Engage enemy | | | | X | X |
| 5. Land navigation | | X | X | | |
| 6. Precombat inspections | | | $X^2$ | | |
| 7. Breaching a mined wire obstacle | | X | | | |
| 8. Security | X | | | | |

| A.2 FIRE SUPPORT | 123Q95 | 4Q95 1Q96 | 2-3Q96 | 4Q96 1Q97 | 2-3Q97 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Commander/FSO integration | X | X | | | X |
| 2. Use of indirect fires | X | X | | X | X |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Indirect fires during close contact | | X | X[2] | X | X |
| 2. Targeting process | X | X | | X | X |
| 3. Automated fire planning | | X | X | X | |
| 4. Failure to adjust fires | X | | | X | X |
| 5. Call for fires | | | | X | X |
| 6. Use of (GPS) Receiver (PLGR) | | | | X | X |
| 7. Use of fire control teams | | | | X | X |
| 8. Q36 operation | | | | X | X |
| 9. Howitzer range cards | | | | X | X |
| 10. Out-of-traverse/6,400-mil missions | | | | X | X |
| 11. Accuracy of mortars | | | | X | X |
| 12. Clearance of fires | X | | | | |
| TA.3 AIR DEFENSE | | | | | |
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. Early warning | X | X | | | |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Early warning | X | | | | X |
| TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY | | | | | |
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. Unit survivability | X | X | X | X | |
| 2. Engineer equipment management | | X[2] | | X | |
| 3. Mine operations | | X[2] | | X | |
| 4. Individual engineer soldier skills | X | | | | |

| | 123Q95 | 4Q95 1Q96 | 2-3Q96 | 4Q96 1Q97 | 2-3Q97 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Force protection | X | X[5] | X[2] | X[3] | X |
| 2. NBC operations proficiency | X[6] | | X | X | X |
| 3. Mine detection/clearance | X | X[3] | | | X |
| 4. Combined arms obstacle integration | X | | | X | X |
| 5. Mine reporting and lane marking | | | | X | X |
| 6. Positioning of crew-served weapons | | | | X | X |
| 7. Battle tracking/reporting | X | | | X | |
| 8. Breaching operations | X | | | | X |
| 9. Improve BSA defense | X | | | | X |
| TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT | | | | | |
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. CASEVAC | X[2] | X[4] | X[2] | X[2] | X[2] |
| 2. Water production | X | X | X | X[2] | |
| 3. Class V resupply | X | X | | X | |
| 4. Maintenance | | X | X | X | X |
| 5. Transportation | | X | | | X |
| 6. Soldiers' load | X | | | | |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Supply/resupply operations | X[4] | X | | | X[2] |
| 2. CSS integration | X[2] | | | X[3] | X |
| 3. Ammunition management | X[3] | X[2] | X | | |
| 4. Maintenance | | | X[3] | X[2] | |
| 5. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) | | X | X | X | X[2] |
| 6. Combat Health Services | X | X | | | X[2] |
| 7. Civil Affairs operations | | | X | X | X |
| 8. Public Affairs operations | | X[8] | | | |

| TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL | 123Q95 | 4Q95 1Q96 | 2-3Q96 | 4Q96 1Q97 | 2-3Q97 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Positive Performance** | | | | | |
| 1. Communications and signal operations | | X | X[3] | X[2] | X[5] |
| 2. Staff integration/synchronization | | X | X[3] | X[2] | X |
| 3. Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) | | X[2] | X[2] | X[2] | |
| 4. Management of $C^3$ assets | X[4] | | | | X[2] |
| 5. Battlefield circulation | X | X | X | X | X |
| 6. Use of junior leaders | X | | X[2] | X[2] | |
| 7. Mission analysis | X | X | | | X |
| 8. Rehearsals | | X | | | |
| **Needs Emphasis** | | | | | |
| 1. Battle tracking and predictive analysis | X[2] | X[2] | X[5] | X[3] | X[3] |
| 2. Communication and signal operations | X[4] | X[4] | X[2] | X[2] | X |
| 3. Battle staff planning and mission analysis | X | X[5] | X[4] | X | X |
| 4. Rehearsals | X | X[3] | X[3] | X[2] | X[2] |
| 5. TOC operations | X[7] | X | X[2] | X | X |
| 6. Course-of-action development and wargaming | X[2] | X[4] | X[2] | X | X |
| 7. Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) | X | X[4] | X[5] | X[4] | X[3] |
| 8. Staff synchronization | X | X[2] | X[6] | X[3] | X[4] |
| 9. Troop leading | X[3] | X | | X | X[2] |
| 10. Information management | X | X | X | X[2] | X |
| 11. Air Liaison officer operations | | X[2] | | X[3] | X |
| 12. Time management | X | X | X | X[2] | X |
| 13. Incomplete/inaccurate estimates | | X | X[2] | X | X |
| 14. Orders development and processing | X | | X | X | X[2] |
| 15. Commander's guidance | | | | X | X[3] |
| 16. Precombat checks | | | | X[2] | |

## SECTION P - POSITIVE PERFORMANCE

### TA.5 INTELLIGENCE

**TA.5 Positive Trend 1: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 1-1: Air defense battery commanders are conducting a thorough initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) with the brigade S-2.

1. They identify the threat air order of battle, their mission, suspected air avenues of approach, and helicopter landing zones (HLZs).
2. They are becoming more adept at templating the locations of enemy air defense assets.
3. Battery commanders conduct thorough analyses of how the enemy air supports the ground effort.
4. Greater understanding in correlating the distance factors of HLZs to battalion trains and company trains has led to more effective templating of enemy HLZs.

### TECHNIQUES

1. Review FM 34-130, July 1994, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.
2. Successful S-2s operate under time constraints, but focus on presenting the staff and commander with a complete SITTEMP as a minimum.
3. Continue training the S-2s in the IPB process for continued familiarity with the logical flow of templates, i.e., doctrinal to situational, and the uses of each.
4. Most S-2s know the IPB process and understand that the products and information needed are the various steps of the military decision-making process (MDMP).

## TA.1 MANEUVER

### TA.1 Positive Trend 1: Use of Night Observation Devices (NODs)

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 1-1: Leaders and soldiers are properly wearing NVDs on head/helmet harness and properly mounting night sights on weapon systems during limited visibility operations. This greatly facilitates movement and security at night. Additionally, soldiers are using their AN/PAQ-4s in conjunction with their NVDs during night engagements to assist in target acquisition.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Key leaders and selected individuals should wear NVDs during night movement.
2. Soldiers **not wearing NVDs** should use the off-center scanning technique during movement at night.
3. Begin wearing NVDs **before EENT** to assist in the transition during twilight when it is too light to use NVDs but too dark to see without them.
4. Remember that it takes about two minutes to completely adapt to the dark after removal of the NVDs.
5. Using NVDs **inhibits the ability to hear, smell, and feel** because of the concentration required to use the NVDs effectively.
6. Integrate NVDs into sector sketches and coverage plans; plan for overlapping NVD coverage at night.
7. Ensure proper use of head/helmet harness; this prevents soldiers having to use their hands to hold NVDs during movement.
8. Do not wear PVS-7 flush against face with head harness; off-set about 1/4 inch from face to retain peripheral vision at night.
9. Leaders must enforce AN/PAQ-4 discipline during night movements; AN/PAQ-4s **indiscriminately turned on** will **give away the unit's position** to a NVD-equipped enemy.

**TA.1 Positive Trend 2: Soldier Load**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 2-1: Leaders continue to do an outstanding job of managing soldier loads. They establish and enforce combat and sustainment loads within their units. Leaders cross-level critical squad supplies and consolidate cold weather gear to minimize the weight soldiers carry. They do an outstanding job of establishing fighting loads (rucks) and approach march loads (assault and butt packs) during contact. Because soldiers are not hindered by heavy loads in contact, they are better able to quickly maneuver against an enemy force.

**PROCEDURES**

1. Establish and then enforce combat and sustainment loads.
2. Cross-level critical squad supplies.
3. Consolidate cold weather gear to minimize soldier carried weight.
4. Establish **fighting loads** (rucks) and **approach march loads** (assault and butt packs) for use **during contact**.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Cache rucks in patrol bases.
2. Use butt packs or assault packs for fighting loads.
3. Pack one ruck per squad with essential cold weather gear for the squad.
4. Conduct leader precombat inspections (PCIs) to enforce load discipline.
5. Push forward duffel bags from the field trains during extended lulls in contact to allow soldiers to cross-level clothing and equipment.
6. Doctrinal references: FM 7-10, ***The Infantry Rifle Company***, Chapter 8, Section III, and FM 21-18, ***Footmarches***, contain detailed discussion on load planning, calculating, and management.

**TA.1 Positive Trend 3: Movement Formations and Techniques**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 3-1: Units consistently **demonstrate the ability to move tactically during daylight conditions**. Soldiers use proper individual movement techniques under direct fire. Squads, platoons, and companies are adept at using proper movement techniques and formations based upon terrain and likelihood of enemy contact.

**TECHNIQUES**

Continue planning movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Transition to a more secure movement technique as the likelihood of enemy contact increases. Leader control of formations and the selection and execution of appropriate movement techniques should be the start point for maneuver training. FM 7-7, 15 March 1985***, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad*** (APC); FM 71-1, 27 Sept 1988, ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force***; and FM 71-2, 22 November 1988***, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, are clear on how to use movement formations and techniques. Units need to continue training and using the tactics and techniques described in each FM.

## TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT

### TA.2 Positive Trend 1: Commander and Fire Support Officer (FSO) Integration

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | | 1 |

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 1-1: The **habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well**. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver.

**TECHNIQUES**

The habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers can be clarified and perpetuated by including the duties within that relationship and the expectations for each within the unit tactical standing operating procedures (SOPs).

### TA.2 Positive Trend 2: Use of Indirect Fires

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 2-1: Use of indirect fires.

1. Battery fire direction centers (FDCs) consistently maintain digital communications with the battalion FDC. They process and transmit fire missions to the gunline using the LCU-GDU link.
2. Limited, but effective, fires now more routinely take place in the brigade rear area.

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 2-2: Use of indirect fires (repeat of Success 2-1). Units have shown great improvement in **incorporating indirect fires in the brigade rear area**. Problems still exist, but we are moving in the right direction. Establishing a fire support cell in the fire support battalion (FSB) TOC from personnel in the FA battalion field trains and incorporating them in the brigade's fire support plan is extremely effective. The best use of a brigade support area (BSA) fire support

officer (FSO) is in support of main support routes (MSRs) and the BSA when they are not in a battalion's sector. When the BSA is within an infantry battalion's sector, sufficient area around the BSA must be allocated to the FSB to control fires (1 kilometer [KM] is a good planning factor).

## TECHNIQUES

1. Successful units use a dedicated rear area FSO and a 24-hour workstation in the FSB TOC.
2. Emphasize rear area fire support during all appropriate Home-Station training exercises.
3. Adequately resource the rear fire support element (FSE) with personnel and equipment, i.e., COLT and/or forward observers and the necessary planning tools.
4. Make use of nonlethal munitions such as smoke or illumination.
5. Integrate indirect fires early into the planning cycle and CSS rehearsals.
6. Practice this integration during Home-Station training.

## TA.6 MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

### TA.6 Positive Trend 1: Unit Survivability

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 1 | |
| 4QFY96 | | |
| 1QFY97 | | |

SUCCESS 1-1: Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, Class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability for many units.

### TA.6 Positive Trend 2: Engineer Equipment Management

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 1 | |
| 4QFY96 | | |
| 1QFY97 | | |

SUCCESS 2-1: Aviation elements obtain engineer assets from the infantry brigade for enhancing force protection; brigade commanders understand the necessity to protect the aviation assets.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Use small emplacement excavator (SEE) and bulldozer support to construct survivability positions protecting aviation assets.
2. According to FM 5-7-30, ***The Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations***, the engineer battalion commander is the brigade engineer and principal advisor to the brigade commander. If not commanding, he should help direct all engineer forces controlled by or supporting the brigade.

**TA.6 Positive Trend 3: Mine Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 3-1: Greater unit employment of **nonstandard** complex obstacles in restrictive and very restrictive terrain.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Minefield indicators, such as destroyed vehicles and equipment, often cause units to halt and employ the most expedient means to maintain their momentum.
2. Improve the ability to maintain momentum.
   - Knowing enemy obstacle templates.
   - Task-organizing engineers forward in the order of march.
3. Report obstacles using the enemy minefield report.
4. Mines are most effective when buried and camouflaged.
5. Tilt-rod fused mines are most effective when buried and camouflaged in tall grass.
6. When employing tilt-rod fused mines in low grass or sand areas, consider increasing the density of the minefield and/or the depth of the mines.
7. Doctrinal reference: FM 20-32, ***Mine/Countermine Operations***, page B-3, for a sample enemy minefield report.
8. A combination of wire, mines, tank ditches, and berms has proven most effective.

## TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

### TA.7 Positive Trend 1: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 2 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 1-1: Evacuate casualties, and utilization of the evacuation liaison team (ELT).

**TECHNIQUES**

1. ELTs provide the personnel and communications equipment necessary to establish proper control and liaison for the forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT).
2. Use the ELT to coordinate all ground and nonstandard air evacuation (CASEVAC) for the brigade.
3. Use the ELT as a dedicated casualty evacuation control communications net.

RESULT: Using the ELT as described virtually eliminates the command and control problems normally associated with FSMT mission execution.

SUCCESS 1-2: (Repeat of Success 1-1). Casualty treatment and collection.

1. Soldiers understand the basic lifesaving steps and are proactive in identifying casualties and performing timely buddy aid.
2. Units are averaging one combat lifesaver per squad.
3. Units do a solid job of evacuating casualties to the company CCP without inflicting further injury.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Synchronize the casualty evacuation plan with the maneuver plan. Do not plan casualty evacuation in isolation.
2. Treat medical evacuation as a combat operation; rehearse the plan at the battalion level.
3. Units must have at least one combat lifesaver per squad.

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 1-3: Casualty evacuation at company level. **CASEVAC at the company level continues to be a strength** and shows the impact of Home-Station training. Platoons and companies normally do an excellent job treating and evacuating casualties as far as the company casualty collection points (CCPs). They are also well-versed in requesting aerial MEDEVAC aircraft and establishing HLZs for extraction.

SUCCESS 1-4: (Repeat of Success 1-3). Casualty collection and evacuation. Units generally arrive at the JRTC with **well-established and well-rehearsed casualty collection plans**. Casualties are usually collected at the company level very quickly after injury, with the majority of soldiers receiving initial treatment within the first hour. Most units have established radio procedures that streamline the evacuation request, and many units have an established "C-in-C CASEVAC" who manages casualty evacuation assets.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Designate at least one combat lifesaver per squad.
2. Dedicate at least one vehicle per squad for evacuation.
3. Task-organize casualty evacuation teams.
4. Provide detailed casualty evacuation instructions in operations orders.
5. Maximize the utilization of combat lifesavers until medics arrive.
6. Ensure that soldiers have a good understanding of transport/movement procedures to collection points.
7. Execute evacuation with a sense of urgency.
8. Synchronize the battalion medical evacuation plan with the maneuver plan. Do not develop the evacuation plan in isolation.
9. Treat medical evacuation as a combat operation. Rehearse at battalion level.
10. Train so the unit has one combat lifesaver per squad.
11. Use the evacuation liaison team (ELT) to coordinate all ground evacuation, air ambulance evacuation, and nonstandard air evacuation (CASEVAC) for the brigade.
12. Use the ELT to establish and maintain one dedicated casualty control communications net.
13. Incorporate CASEVAC as part of the combined arms battle drills for breaching and route clearance operations.
14. Prior to movement, leaders must know the MEDEVAC frequency and the location of combat lifesavers and medics, and have field litters available on lead vehicles to expedite CASEVAC when/where a direct fire threat exists.
15. Better planning, Home-Station mass casualty training, additional combat lifesavers, and increased casualty exercises.
16. The aggressive use of nonstandard casualty evacuation vehicles and the forward positioning of medical personnel. The overall effect of this technique has been a general decrease in the number of soldiers who die of their wounds.

**TA.7 Positive Trend 2: Water Production**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 2 | |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 2-1: Forward support battalions (FSBs) are developing habitual relationships with their main support battalion (MSB) slices, ration team, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU), etc., and including the slices into FSB and brigade field training.

SUCCESS 2-2: Units are focusing on the integration of preventive medicine, security, and maintenance for their ROWPU operations, thus providing the task force with safe, continuous water support.

**TECHNIQUES**

Continue to focus on integration of preventative medicine, security, and maintenance.

**TA.7 Positive Trend 3: Class V Resupply**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 1 | |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 3-1: Field Artillery (FA) battalions continue to improve their ammunition planning and management. The staffs are doing a better job of identifying ammunition needs, controlling expenditures, and rapidly resupplying the batteries.

**TA.7 Positive Trend 4: Maintenance**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

SUCCESS 4-1: Soldiers display a superior knowledge of aircraft maintenance skills.

1. Aircraft mechanics demonstrate the ability to perform both real-world and notional repairs in a tactical environment.
2. AVUM units have made great strides in planning for deployment. Most maintenance slices now deploy with the appropriate tools, test equipment, and repair parts to support 40 or more aircraft.

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 4-2: The aircraft readiness rate is being **maintained well above 90 percent** during rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Soldiers display exceptional knowledge in military occupational speciality (MOS) skills and are extremely proficient in aircraft repairs. Aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) aircraft maintenance practices and procedures are doctrinally sound. AVUM production controllers are proactive in their attempts to report aircraft status to the task force commander.

**TA.7 Positive Trend 5: Transportation**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 2-3QFY97 | | 1 |

SUCCESS 5-1: Units that were successful **conducted aerial resupply planning early and then continually made adjustments** as the situation or tactical plan changed. Specific planning considerations were made to drop-zone (DZ) locations and management of sling assets. Units have improved at conducting precombat inspections (PCIs) which has resulted in drop zones being set up with the proper equipment and sling-load equipment being at the right location.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Maximize Home-Station and intermediate staging base (ISB) opportunities to train.
2. Coordinate directly with the provider (FSB or ASG) to increase the probability of success.
3. Provide the FSB with a liaison, as needed.
4. Operationally control aircraft to the FSB during periods of high resupply requirements.

## TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

### TA.4 Positive Trend 1: Communications and Signal Operations

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 5 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 1-1: Forward support battalions use redundant means of communications (PRC-127s, switchboards, FMs, etc.) within the brigade support area to communicate with subordinate units.

SUCCESS 1-2: Unit use of Mobile Subscriber Radio Terminals (MSRTs).

1. Units rely heavily on the MSRTs for commander and staff coordination and synchronization of task force operations.
2. Some units attach speakers (MSRTs and DNVTS).
   - Use MSE telephones to conduct conference calls.
   - Commander and staff updates.
   - Supplement commander's battlefield circulation.

2-3QFY97

SUCCESS 1-3: **Regular and timely communications** between company commanders and members of the battalion staff **are critical to the successful synchronization of operations**. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on-the-fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.

SUCCESS 1-4: Over the last several rotations, aviation task forces have improved significantly in their ability to communicate. This improvement is due to increased proficiency by the operators as well as the **outstanding maintenance performed and supervised by the communications sections**.

SUCCESS 1-5: Units have been successful in using mobile subscriber equipment during their operations at the training center. **MSE has been established early on and has been maintained throughout rotations**. The use of MSE has provided brigades with redundant means of communications and has freed up command nets to control current operations.

SUCCESS 1-6: Brigades have **employed FM retrans systems effectively**. As a result, commanders and staffs have been able to $C^2$ operations over extended distances. Keys to success in the use of FM retrans usage have been the integration of the brigade signal officer (BSO) during the MDMP, effective terrain analysis, and reconnaissance of retrans locations.

Additionally, brigades have employed FM retrans assets forward early to validate divisions made during planning.

SUCCESS 1-7: Brigade signal elements have been **successful in utilizing numerous communications to support operations** at the training center. Brigades have the flexibility to incorporate several different assets into their operations to facilitate $C^2$. Assets used during operations include single channel tactical satellites (TAC-SAT), Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), MSE, and digital nets.

**<u>TA.4 Positive Trend 2</u>: Staff Integration/Synchronization**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

SUCCESS 2-1: The coordination between the brigade and the MSE company supporting the brigade has been outstanding.

1. Units have made great improvements integrating the divisional MSE assets into the brigade slice elements.
2. Habitual relationships (small extension node [SEN] team chiefs, force entry switch [FES] platoon leaders, and MSE company commanders) greatly enhance the success of the signal units as well as the supported units.

SUCCESS 2-2: The habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of determining **when** fires are critical and **where** fires must be placed, and understanding the **restrictions** for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

SUCCESS 2-3: Brigades have **integrated smoke platoon operations well into maneuver planning**. Smoke platoon assets have contributed greatly to the success of both defensive and offensive operations. Specifically, the brigades have utilized smoke assets to supplement deception operations and during the employment of volcano mine systems.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Use Message Form 4004 and DA Form 1594 to pass information.
2. Develop TOC battle drills and include them in the unit SOP.
3. Use a standard format for all shift change briefings. Ensure all BOS personnel attend and brief their respective areas.
4. Conduct detailed wargaming to prepare for inevitable change. The staff must develop and rehearse branches and sequels derived from detailed wargaming of all aspects of the air assault (e.g., ground tactical plan, landing plan, etc.).
5. Enhance the ability to conduct detailed rehearsals and simplify briefing subordinates.
   - To supplement the air movement table (AMT), use "Tadpole diagrams" to lay out the air movement table visually.
   - Incorporate the bump plan, and lay out each lift, serial, and chalk by type of aircraft and type load.
6. Enhance identification of detection and destruction assets by consistently integrating the brigade air liaison officer (BALO), support arms liaison team officer (SALTO), air defense officer (ADO), and task force engineer into targeting meetings.

### TA.4 Positive Trend 3: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96<br>1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|

2

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 3-1: When battalion commanders formally stated CCIR, they were well-defined across the battlefield operating systems and provided the detail necessary to facilitate battle staff planning and tracking of operations. Trends show that commanders and units that identify and track relevant CCIR throughout a rotation are more situationally aware and maintain a higher state of visibility on information that relates to current and future operations.

SUCCESS 3-2: Commanders generally issue clear and concise guidance that assists the staff in developing courses of action during the MDMP. Most commanders issue guidance to each BOS member after mission analysis and prior to course-of-action development.

## PROCEDURES

1. Develop and rehearse TOC and combat train command post (CTCP) battle drills for recurring actions.

2. The company commander should coordinate with the TF fire support officer (FSO) for fire support.

3. Battalion SOPs must address all members of the TOC. It must contain a clear and separate list of tasks to be accomplished by each individual.

4. SOPs should describe how key personnel in the TOC should perform their duties. They must include attached special staff. Develop and rehearse TOC and combat train command post (CTCP) battle drills for recurring actions.

5. Use the format in FM 6-71, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander***, i.e., Purpose, Priority, Allocation, Restrictions, when writing fire support guidance.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Train staff synchronization at Home Station.
   - Conduct Home-Station collective training using the military decision-making process.
   - Integrate maneuver element staffs with CSS staffs and military police.
   - Consider all Home-Station training events as tactical missions.
   - Require the staff to develop a concept using the MDMP, produce an order, and brief.
   - Conduct multiechelon training.
   - Deploy the tactical CP or TOC and CTCP to train concurrently on staff/TOC SOPs.
   - Platoons and companies deploy to conduct internal training.
2. Ensure synchronization of combat multipliers:
   - Incorporate the entire staff, including BOS representatives and attachments, into all aspects of TOC operations.
   - Emphasize wargaming, staff huddles, shift changeover briefings, and targeting meetings.
3. Train the battle staff to work together as a team.
4. Plan to use the same personnel on the same shift.
5. The Bn XO and S-3 should provide clear guidance and supervision for the accomplishment of duties and responsibilities.
6. Use simple, well-rehearsed, standard breach drills.
7. Practice coordinating and integrating beyond the survivability execution matrix.
8. Include integration of survivability requirements and linkup instructions with the quartering party in planning unit moves.
9. Execute survivability operations prior to unit occupation.
10. Designate a “synch dozer,” usually a CSM or 1SG, to synchronize survivability assets/effort.
11. Conduct targeting meetings.
12. Develop synchronization matrices.
13. Prepare decision support templates, operational schedules (OPSKEDs), and execution checklists.
14. Conduct wargaming and technical and combined arms rehearsals.

15. Doctrinal references:

- FM 1-112, ***Attack Helicopter Operations.***
- FM 90-13-1, ***Combined Arms Breaching Operations*** with Change 1, Appendix D, "Breaching Rehearsals," and Chapter 3-6.

16. Use multiple warning orders to allow parallel planning at lower echelons.

**<u>TA.4 Positive Trend 4</u>: Management of $C^3$ Assets**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | | 2 |

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

SUCCESS 4-1: Leader cross-talk and communications. **Regular and timely communications** between company commanders and members of the battalion staff **are critical to the successful synchronization of operations**. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on-the-fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.

SUCCESS 4-2: Brigade signal elements have been **successful in utilizing numerous communications to support operations** at the training center. Brigades have the flexibility to incorporate several different assets into their operations to facilitate $C^2$. Assets used during operations include Single-Channel Tactical Satellites (TAC-SAT), Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), MSE, and digital nets.

**TECHNIQUES**

Continue to reinforce skills by routine Home-Station training involving digital communications between Fire Finder Radar (Q36), FA battalion FDC (LTACFIRE), brigade FSO (LTACFIRE), DIVARTY (LTACFIRE), Bn FSO (FED), and Firing Battery (BCS).

**<u>TA.4 Positive Trend 5</u>: Battlefield Circulation**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 1 | |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 5-1: Commanders, accompanied by select staff officers, are increasing the frequency of battlefield circulation. Daily visits to units throughout the brigade area of operations significantly increase command group situational awareness and allow for the personal interaction between brigade commanders and their subordinates. Movement through the brigade sector gives the command group a better feeling of how operations are progressing on the ground. Command Sergeants Major that accompany their brigade commanders add significantly to the command group's presence in front of soldiers.

**TA.4 Positive Trend 6: Use of Junior Leaders**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96<br>1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 2 | |

4QFY96
1QFY97

SUCCESS 6-1: The utilization and integration of TOC NCOs into TOC operations are continuing to improve. Although some units do not maximize the NCOs' potential in managing information, the NCOs' initiative, drive, and involvement are an integral part of successful TOC operations. Units that send their TOC NCOs to the **battle staff course** and then let them apply the techniques they learn get very positive results.

SUCCESS 6-2: Soldiers are physically fit, motivated, and disciplined. They maintain their spirits under harsh weather conditions and punishing enemy contact. Their aggressiveness is the key to many successful engagements against the enemy.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Keep the staff "in the loop." Advise them of the commander's changing vision of the battlefield.
2. Devise a way to capture and disseminate decisions made during the commander's trips and the discussions with subordinates in the battle area.
3. Recommend using an alert recorder (assistant S3, chemical officer) to accompany the commander and to capture the commander's evolving vision.
4. Conduct a SYNCHEX, a periodic rewargaming of the brigade plan by key staff and possibly subordinate unit representatives, to ensure that all BOS are integrated and that timing issues are addressed based on the more detailed knowledge of terrain and battle space.

5. Following the SYNCHEX, issue a FRAGO which succinctly captures refinements made to the original OPORD.

6. Daily visits to units throughout the brigade area of operations significantly increase command group situational awareness and allow for personal interaction between brigade commanders and their subordinates.

7. Frequent movement through the brigade sector gives the command group a better feeling of how operations are progressing on the ground.

8. Command Sergeants Major should accompany their brigade commanders to enhance the command group's presence in front of soldiers.

## TA.4 Positive Trend 7: Mission Analysis

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
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| 2-3QFY97 | | |

SUCCESS 7-1: Overall, brigade level organizations **have executed mission analysis to standard**. Integral to their success has been products and tools used to capture and communicate the results of the analysis. Additionally, staffs have been successful in utilizing assistant staff officers to gather general information, i.e., assets available, combat power, etc., while primary staff officers were attending division-level operations orders.

### TECHNIQUES

Conduct mission analysis on new missions.

- Integrates new mission into existing plans.
- Identifies potential problems.
- Facilitates execution.

## SECTION N - NEEDS EMPHASIS

### TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE

**TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
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4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Aviation S-2s are generally not familiar with all the steps of the IPB process and the importance of IPB products to the military decision-making process (MDMP) and subsequent mission execution. S-2s produce the initial products required by defining the battlefield environment and describing the battlefield effects, but do not integrate these products with the rest of the staff during the decision-making process.

1. S-2s too often fail to integrate initial IPB products (MCOO, etc.) into the MDMP.
2. S-2s normally produce only one situational template based on the enemy's most probable course of action.
3. After the unit begins executing a mission, S-2s do not continuously and appropriately update IPB products; instead, they tend to focus solely on the situation map.

RESULT:

1. Too often the enemy's **most dangerous** course of action is ignored.
2. The battle staff lacks the necessary enemy COAs to viably conduct wargaming.
3. Battlefield information is not sufficiently analyzed and products that **should** result from such analysis either are not produced, or, if produced, not distributed in time to subordinate element commanders.
4. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-130, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: S-2s understand threat capabilities, doctrine, and effects of the battlefield, but often do not translate this baseline knowledge into clear and complete depictions of enemy COAs. S-2s are always confronted by limited planning time.

RESULT:

1. Commanders and their planning staffs are not being presented with timely situation templates (SITTEMP), descriptions of enemy COAs based on friendly plans, or listings of HVTs.
2. Some products prepared are incomplete.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The S-2 must become familiar with the IPB process and its integration into the MDMP.
2. Home-Station training: use the battalion XO to conduct MDMP training with the battle staff. Emphasize the IPB process and integrate IPB products into the entire process.
3. Review Chapter 2 of FM 34-130, July 1994, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.
4. Successful S-2s operate under time constraints but focus on presenting the staff and commander with a complete SITTEMP, as a minimum. The S-2 can reduce the other elements of a complete enemy COA to bullet notes or brief them.

**TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan Development**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

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4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) planning and collection management are two related areas that are consistently weak.

1. S-2s do not identify the critical elements of information.
2. R&S plans are often unfocused.
3. S-2s are often unprepared to serve as the battalion and brigade collection managers.
   - Unfamiliar with the collection management process.
   - Do not know the capabilities and limitations of the available collection systems.

PROBLEM 2-2: Intelligence fails to identify critical elements in the R&S plan to help fully develop the targeting process. S-2s frequently do not provide focused input to targeting meetings.

## TECHNIQUES

1. S-2s have responsibilities during all four phases (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess) of the continuous targeting process.
2. Support the “Decide” phase:
   - Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs) during targeting meetings.
   - Recommend high-payoff targets (HPTs).
   - Brief the status of available collection systems.

3. Support the “Detect” and “Deliver” phases. Estimate when HPTs will be within range of friendly delivery systems by using an event template.

4. Support the “Assess” phase. Recommend collection assets.

5. Use leaders from supporting MI companies and battalions to provide subject matter experts for training battalion and brigade staffs on the capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of military intelligence collection systems.

6. References:

- FM 34-130, 8 July 1994, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***, Chapters 1 and 2.
  - How the IPB process helps identify specific collection needs.
  - How intelligence collection supports the staff estimate process.
- FM 34-2, 8 March 1994, ***Collection Management and Synchronization Planning***.
  - Provides a review of collection management's basic tenets.
- FM 34-2-1, 19 June 1991, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance***.
  - Basis for R&S planning and execution.
  - A review of basic doctrinal references.

7. Accurate BDA tracking is key to the “Decide” phase of follow-on targeting meetings. The staff must decide to attack targets again or shift assets to other targets.

8. Reference FM 6-20-10, 29 March 1990, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process,*** Appendix A.

**TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: S-2 Analysis and Reporting**

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|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: The breakdown of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) into specific information requirements, serious incident reports (SIRs), and dissemination of indicators; and reporting criteria for specific orders and requests (SORs) to deployed assets are two key weaknesses.

RESULT:

1. Critical reports needed for the decision-making process do not reach the S-2 in a timely manner and are often historical.

2. Critical information regarding enemy timelines, threat situation, and target composition/disposition are not consistently pushed down by the S-2 and the analysis and control team.

3. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to the brigade S-2, but with little analysis.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The commander should review SIR and SOR as a part of his mission backbriefs from subordinate leaders.
2. The military intelligence (MI) company team commander should require signal intelligence (SIGINT), traffic analysis (TA) team, and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) analysts to produce a summary of activity every 12 hours.
3. Team leaders and above need to review FM 34-3, ***Intelligence Analyst***, to clearly understand their responsibilities concerning the breakdown of priority PIR into SIR/SOR and subsequent indicators.

**TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Effective Use of Assets**

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| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
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2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Analysis Control Team (ACT) asset is poorly managed and utilized.

1. The ACT has difficulty executing all-source analysis in support of the brigade.
2. Soldiers are unsure of their role in the ACT and the function of their section of the TOC.
3. Shift changeovers are not conducted smoothly or with a focus toward the incoming shift.
4. Lack of an ACT "battle rhythm" hinders most sections from producing products the S-2 could use if presented in a timely manner.

RESULT:

1. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to brigade, but with little analysis.
2. Soldiers are completely unfamiliar with the all-source analysis system and its capabilities.
3. Junior analysts work well with the S-2, but do not routinely execute "reverse battlefield operating systems (BOS) IPB" with other members of the battle staff.
4. A 24-hour operation suffers without a proper sleep plan and so does the staff brief associated with shift changeover. These staff changeovers disrupt "battle rhythm" necessary for battle tracking and tempo of operations.

PROBLEM 4-2: Just as it is critical to integrate all task force elements, hospital and clinical staffs must not be left out. Because of location and separation of functions, information flow between hospital elements and the tactical operations center (TOC) is limited.

RESULT:

1. Hospital staff, who often obtain intelligence information from casualties, cannot pass this information to the S-2.

2. Clinical personnel are not usually incorporated into operational planning and, therefore, cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Conduct weekly training with the analysis control element (ACE) to increase soldier knowledge and future use of all-source analysis system (ASAS).

2. The ASAS can be used to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database, upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, only a few of its uses.

3. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the area of operations (AO) but within the area of interest (AI) to familiarize him with the capabilities.

4. Integrate the ACT into the brigade TOC set-up, preferably between the S-3 and S-2, and update the company SOP, clearly outlining the tasks of the ACT.

5. Commanders need to force-integrate all staff and task force elements prior to deployment in order to develop a task force focus on arrival.

6. S-2s need to develop within the unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) a system that allows for the reporting of information taken from casualties and the processing of that information.

## TA. 1 MANEUVER

### TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Direct Fire Planning

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
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| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 1 | |
| 4QFY96 | | |
| 1QFY97 | | |

PROBLEM 1-1: Improper terrain analysis and inadequate understanding of how the enemy plans to fight leads to poor direct fire planning. There is little synchronization of direct, indirect, and obstacle plans in the defense, and fire control discipline needs improvement.
RESULT: Units are not positioning weapons to effectively engage and destroy targets.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Leaders at the platoon and company level must conduct their own IPB to determine where to kill the enemy before they position their weapons.
2. Leaders must understand the terrain and anticipate the enemy's most probable course of action.
3. Develop and sustain the basic skills essential to direct fire planning (aiming stakes, range cards, sector sketches, and basic fire control measures, TRPs, maximum engagement lines, trigger lines and fire commands).
4. Rehearsals are key to synchronizing fires with the obstacle plan.
5. CALFEXs build soldier confidence in his weapon and provide real-time feedback on the integration of direct and indirect fires on a target.
6. References: FM 7-8, ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***, FM 101-5-1, ***Operational Terms and Graphics***, FM 7-10, ***The Infantry Rifle Company***, and FM 7-20, ***The Infantry Battalion***.

### TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Actions on Contact

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
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| 2-3QFY97 | | |

PROBLEM 1-2: Units continue to perform poorly in the first moments of contact with enemy units. General problems include an initial hesitation to react, failure to establish a base of fire

sufficient to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to a flank, and failure to include indirect fire assets in the response.

RESULT:

1. Many contacts result in several friendly casualties and an enemy who escapes unscathed.
2. Soldiers' execution of individual movement and marksmanship wins the day in the close fight.

**TECHNIQUE**

Review CALL Newsletter No. 97-17, Sep 97, ***NTC Trends Compendium***; refer to "Actions on Contact."

**TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Force Protection**

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| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

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4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: Aviation units commit fratricides on an average of three incidents per rotation.

1. Lack of an effective friendly recognition signal.
2. Lack of a clear understanding of the rules of engagement.
3. Failure to properly identify friendly vehicles.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Units must take every precaution and develop effective plans to reduce the risk of fratricide.
2. References:
   - CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, Apr 92, ***Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses***.
   - CALL Newsletter No. 95-9, Jun 95, ***Risk Management for Brigades and Battalions***. (Both publications are good references for developing fratricide prevention SOPs.)
   - JRTC video: Air/Ground Coordination in the Hasty Attack (JRTC).

**<u>TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 4</u>: Engage Enemy**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
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4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 1-5: Units do not prepare range cards to standard. Most range cards are missing critical information: FPL, dead space, TRP, direction and elevation information, etc.
RESULT: Poor interlocking fires between positions and gaps in defensive sectors.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Leaders must enforce use of range cards in all defensive and security positions.
2. Use a standardized acetate-covered range card format for every weapon in the platoon.
3. References: STP 7-11BCHM Task No. 071-312-3307, p. 3-260; FM 7-8, ***The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)***, Chapter 2, pp. 2-76 to 2-78.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 1-6: Units are unable to execute the find, fix, and finish methodology against a quick-hitting and elusive enemy. Although most company commanders can provide a correct doctrinal definition of mutual support, few are able to translate the concept into the appropriate time/distance relationship between elements on the ground. The platoons continually make contact with their nearest supporting element a kilometer or more away.
RESULTS:

1. Engagements tend to last seconds/minutes whereas the movements of supporting elements require minutes/hours to execute.
2. Most commanders employ either a linear scheme of maneuver with two or three platoons abreast or a decentralized independent platoon/squad search technique.
3. Once contact is made, both of these techniques rely on the rapid movement of supporting elements to converge on and fix the enemy.
4. Units find it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome the mobility factor: the enemy moves as fast or faster than you do.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The decisive point technique executed at the company level (outlined in CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Feb 97, ***Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***) applies the "hammer and anvil" approach. One platoon forms the fix (anvil) element by establishing ambushes along likely lines of drift into and out of the search zone. The remaining two platoons (hammer) search the zone, sweeping enemy forces toward the ambushes.

2. References: CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Feb 97, ***Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,*** pp. II-9 to II-10; FM 7-10, ***The Infantry Rifle Company***, pp. 4-14 to 4-19; FM 7-20, ***The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault)***, pp. 3-18 to 3-23.

## TA. 2 FIRE SUPPORT

### TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Indirect Fires During Close Contact

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contacts.

1. There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the enemy is often only 200-300 meters away.
2. Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation. They are not well-trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy forces.
3. Decentralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the search and attack phase of operations.

RESULT:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.
2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Plan for and **use** artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.
2. Use priority targets for both the mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick-fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.
3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground upon contact. Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold, accurate shift and fire for effect.
4. Always give accurate target descriptions and make sure that the attack guidance is fully understood.
5. Fire support team (FIST) training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving.
6. Train forward observers (FOs) on rapidly determining a target location and initiating a complete call for fire while on the move **and under attack**.
7. Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "The PLGR:

Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate, Indirect Fires to the Close Fight" in CALL Newsletter No. 96-10, Oct 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin***.

8. Use every available Home-Station training opportunity to conduct **battle drills** on contact, using **one round adjustments, bold shifts**, and the appropriate shifting and firing of **priority targets**.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their observers and FSOs to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.
2. Company fire support officers (FSOs) and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars along the unit's route.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template enemy positions and likely ambush sites.
2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target. **Use the minimum safe distance of the weapon system designated** to signal the shift to a new target.
3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.
4. See "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" by LTC David L. Anderson in CALL Newsletter No. 96-4, 2d Qtr, Mar 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin***.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Targeting Process**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 1-1: The brigade-level targeting process often lacks focus. It fails to orient collection and supporting fires.

1. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).
2. Most units do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus their collection plans or task specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest.

3. There is often little follow-up on taskings to subordinate units as part of the targeting process.

4. The **decide** element is being performed adequately, but the execution of **detect**, **deliver, and assess** needs great improvement.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: The battle staff targeting process needs improvement.

1. Intelligence, operations, and fire support personnel do not focus on the targeting process.
2. High-value target (HVT) lists are rarely disseminated to subordinate units.
3. Subordinate units who received the HVT lists did not use them to produce high-payoff target (HPT) lists during the target planning process.
4. Meetings did not occur on a regular basis; S-2s did not present the current enemy situation.
5. S-2s conduct insufficient enemy analysis during the "decide" phase of the process.

RESULTS: The **detect** phase of the targeting process is not clearly focused; therefore, the **delivery** phase is inadequate due to prior flaws in the targeting process.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The targeting process must become a routine action managed by the brigade XO or S-3.
   - Use the commander's intent to focus on finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy.
   - "Decide, Detect Deliver, Assess" is a continuous process that must be understood and integrated by all brigade task force BOS members.
2. Incorporate the targeting process into battle staff training.
3. Ensure that the appropriate personnel prepare for and attend targeting meetings. Staff should be prepared as follows:
   - **S-2** should present:
     - Analysis of current enemy situation.
     - The current high-value targets (HVTs).
     - A recommended list of high-payoff targets (HPTs).
   - **S-3** should:
     - Present the current friendly situation.
     - Describe future operations.
   - **At the conclusion**: S-3 cuts a FRAGO.
4. FSO/targeting officer coordination:
   - Work closely with the S-2 to develop HPTs.
   - Continually coordinate with all brigade elements for the most accurate, up-to-date information for proposed targets.
5. Doctrinal reference: FM 6-20-10, ***The Targeting Process***.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Automated Fire Planning**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 1 | |

PROBLEM 3-1: Although units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely fully exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/IFSAS system.

1. Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.
2. Too many units have inexperienced operators.
3. Too often the unit chain of command fails to enforce use of the system.
4. Even units with excellent TACFIRE SOPs too often **fail to follow the SOP**.

RESULT:

1. Fire plans are not disseminated or fired.
2. Inefficient use of resources.
3. Failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Exploit the system. Ensure that **both** operators and leaders fully understand the capabilities of the system.
2. Establish effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training at Home Station, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Failure to Adjust Fires**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 2-3QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 4-1: Too many forward observers (FOs) initiate calls for fire using non-doctrinal, incomplete formats. EXAMPLE: calling in a grid location and nothing more.
RESULT: Critical loss of time as the firing unit must then request target size, description, and direction.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Fire support NCOs and officers must train FO teams IAW FM 6-30, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire***, Chapter 4.

2. All members of the battalion FSE must know the proper **call for fire format** and the **six elements required** to properly initiate a voice fire mission.

3. FIST training should include radio rehearsals and use of the TSFO; emphasize proper call-for-fire formats.

4. Ensure soldiers understand the necessity of providing the fire direction center with accurate and proper information the first time to increase mission processing times and ensure faster rounds on target.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 5: Call for Fires**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 2-3QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 5-1: (Repeat of Problem 4-1).

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 6: Use of (GPS) Receiver (PLGR)**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 2-3QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 6-1: During the LIC and deliberate attack, most FOs turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode while moving.
RESULT: When the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode.
2. Use it upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.
3. Implement the techniques described in "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," CALL Newsletter No. 96-10, 4th Qtr, Oct 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin***.
4. Reference: TM 11-5825-29-13.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 7: Use of Fire Control Teams**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 7-1: Many units come to JRTC with little or no knowledge of how to employ fire control teams (FCTs).

1. Most units do not train with the FCTs at Home Station. They train with them for the first time when they arrive at the ISB.
2. Most maneuver commanders do not adequately understand the employment capabilities of FCTs.

## TECHNIQUES

1. **Attach the FCT to a rifle company or a scout platoon** to provide responsive naval gun fires as well as a terminal close air support (CAS) control capability at the company or platoon level. This technique works well when there are limited fire support assets available (for example, during initial insertion or when operating forward of field artillery and/or mortar ranges).
2. **Treat the FCTs independently** during reconnaissance operations. Assign the FCT a named area of interest (NAI) or some other area in which to operate. This gives the maneuver commander more sets of eyes forward to cover more area. This forward employment requires detailed planning for communications, resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and potential extraction/exfiltration of the FCTs when they operate independently and far and/or forward.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 8: Q36 Operation**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Field artillery planners too often do not have an adequate understanding of the firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute using the system. Too often the **targeting technician**, the firefinder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations beyond site selection until **after the battle has begun**. Many field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than the system can actually deliver.

RESULT:

1. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to **execute unrealistic plans**.
2. The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future operations.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Conduct extensive Home-Station training with the system so that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.
2. At Home Station, conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system, i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and terrain.
3. Make the **targeting technician** an integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early.
4. Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience**.**

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 9: Howitzer Range Cards**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 9-1: Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card or only a partially completed one. Frequently, howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data for antipersonnel (APERS) ammunition or Killer Junior.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during precombat checks and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard.
2. **Reinforce the value** of the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements.
3. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, 23 December 1996, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Cannon Battery***, Chapter 3, p. 3-12.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 10: Out-of-Traverse/6,400-mil missions**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96<br>1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 10-1: Firing units often experience difficulty executing out-of-traverse missions.

1. Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for each octant.
2. Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) for each octant.
3. Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage netting, prohibits true 6,400-mil capability.
4. Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly.
5. Lack of aiming reference points and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths further inhibits crews from executing out-of-traverse/6,400-mil missions.
6. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up displacement.
7. Units are not using distant aiming points (DAPs) despite their availability.

RESULT: Slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire missions.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-40, 23 April 1996, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery***; FM 6-50, 23 December 1996, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery***; and the appropriate howitzer -10.

2. Ensure the XO and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions, especially setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6,400 mils.

3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.

4. Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.

5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6,400-mil operations.

**TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 11: Accuracy of Mortars**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 2-3QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 11-1: Fire support officers (FSOs) are not providing timely meteorological (MET) data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars. The mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get meteorological (MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer) and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).

2. The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units register the mortars and should ensure that this tasking is included in the operations order.

## TA. 3 AIR DEFENSE

### TA.3 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Early Warning

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Brigade air defense artillery (ADA) units have experienced difficulty maintaining consistent early warning. Light and Special Divisions Interim Sensor (LSDIS) early warning radars have been improperly placed, resulting in the system not being maximized to its fullest capability. Battery command posts have had difficulty maintaining communications on the division early warning net.
RESULT: Both problems have led to ADA elements assigned to the brigade being unsuccessful in interdicting enemy aircraft.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. The brigade air defense artillery officer (ADAO) must ensure that he conducts a thorough IPB to identify enemy air avenues of approach and then conduct the necessary terrain analysis to determine the best position to place the LSDIS radar.
2. Communications must be maintained on the division early warning net to receive timely information specific to enemy air activity.

## TA. 6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

### TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Force Protection

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Most signal units lack the training and equipment to adequately defend themselves from OPFOR attacks.

1. Individual and group tactical movement/patrolling.
2. Preparation of individual and crew-served fighting positions.
3. Proper emplacement and operation of an LP/OP and construction.
4. Planning and maintenance of tactical and protective obstacles.

PROBLEM 1-2: Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with organic manpower.

1. Manpower shortages.
2. Training and command emphasis should be placed on the officers' and NCOs' lack of basic soldiering skills.

PROBLEM 1-3: Leaders and soldiers are not taking the proper steps to protect the force.

1. Improper movement techniques.
2. Inadequate preparation of individual fighting positions; i.e., use of sector stakes, preparation of range cards, fighting position construction.
3. Poor dispersion during halts or in patrol bases.
4. Poor noise, light, and litter discipline.
5. Inadequate use of observation posts.
6. Inadequate local security patrolling.
7. Failure to understand the **rules of engagement**.
8. Poor passive/active air defense measures.
9. Inadequate leader supervision of field hygiene.

RESULT: Preventable loss of life and combat power.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: Individual and crew-served weapon positions are not completed to standard, often lacking overhead cover. The use of obstacles is nonexistent. Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.
RESULT: The continual improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.

## TECHNIQUES

1. All leaders and soldiers should review FM 7-8, ***The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)***, and FM 5 -103, ***Survivability***, for techniques and standards for defensive measures.

2. FM 20-3, ***Camouflage***, gives company-level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.

3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.

4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.

5. Leaders must ensure force protection is a priority, and the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.

6. FM 5-34, ***Engineer Field Data***, discusses construction of tactical and protective obstacles.

7. GTA 7-6-1, ***Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card***, covers the construction of the common types of individual and crew-served fighting positions.

8. Aviation leaders must maximize the use of engineer assets to compensate for manpower shortages.

9. Use aviation warrant officers to augment the overall protect-the-force effort.

10. Construct individual fighting positions to standard, with particular emphasis on sector stakes, clearing fields of fire, range cards, and sector sketches.

11. Practice squad and platoon movement techniques consistent with desired speed, security, cover and concealment, fields of fire, dispersion, command and control, and enemy threat.

12. Treat every halt as a hasty defense. Begin preparing hasty fighting positions when halts last more than 15 minutes.

13. Practice a disciplined response to hostile air, both fixed and rotary wing.

14. Use vignettes to train soldiers on situational application of the rules of engagement. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-2, Mar 95, ***Peace Operations Training Vignettes***.

15. Proactive patrolling techniques designed to find the enemy, determine his strength and dispositions, and provide early warning and security.

16. Enforce, at all levels, strict adherence to noise, light, and litter discipline.

17. Enforce field hygiene. (Note: In heavily forested and vegetated areas, soldiers are susceptible to poison ivy and poison oak, particularly in the summer and fall.)

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 2</u>: NBC Operations Proficiency**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: The main causes for chemical casualties is a lack of early warning and noncompliance with directed force protection measures (not following established battle drills).

1. Units within affected chemical attack areas fail to properly employ their M8A1 chemical agent alarms.
2. Alarms are normally emplaced but not checked to ensure proper operation.
3. The improper emplacement of the M8A1s also results in no early warning for units and the loss of soldiers.
4. The brigade-directed MOPP level is frequently ignored or misunderstood.
5. During chemical attacks, some units do not have masks and MOPP gear readily available.
6. When units react to a chemical hazard, they normally mask and give the alarm, but stop short of increasing the level of MOPP.
7. The unit sustains a high amount of casualties due to lack of protection and reaction throughout the area.

RESULT: Units sustain significant casualties from chemical attacks.

2-3 QFY97

PROBLEM 2-2: Recent observations tend to support a lack of emphasis on NBC operations at the brigade task force level. Subordinate units consistently have performed poorly during the execution of both collective and individual level NBC-related tasks.
RESULT: Brigade staffs generally do not pay particular attention to NBC input until forced to go into mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Conduct individual training to standard using the tasks outlined in STP 21-1, SCMT, using a collective or STX format (see TC 3-8, ***Chemical Training for Guidance***).
2. Generate battle drills for the TOC and leader's actions that coincide with ARTEP 7-8/7-10, MTP, and make them part of the TACSOP.
3. Integrate NBC battle drills into TOCEXs, STAFFEXs, TEWTs, and other training vehicles.
4. Leaders must supervise and become effective in the unit’s response to a chemical attack and not just wait for it to go away or be told what to do.
5. Brigades must place more emphasis on NBC operations and better incorporate the BOS into mission planning.
6. Attention needs to be paid to collective and individual level NBC training at Home Station.

**TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Mine Detection/Clearance**

Observation frequency: 4QFY96
1QFY97 2-3QFY97

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2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Maneuver commanders at all levels have demonstrated a lack of tactical patience and have pressured engineers into quickly conducting route sweep operations. Task force commanders do not conduct deliberate risk analysis and do not determine the appropriate clearance method.
RESULT: This frequently results in minefields being discovered by the destruction of lead vehicles in the route clearance team.

## PROCEDURES

1. Modify the SALUTE report to include more detailed information on enemy obstacles.
2. Develop and implement an enemy obstacle marking SOP.

## TECHNIQUES

Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.

l. Train soldiers to gain and maintain mine awareness.

2. Use Home-Station training opportunities to train route clearance as a combined arms operation.

3. Establish a mine dump for each obstacle group.

4. Train mine detector operators IAW the applicable TM. Develop squad level SOPs.

5. The assistant brigade engineer and the engineer company commander must synchronize and develop an enemy obstacle template to assist in the IPB analysis and in the development of a combined arms route clearance plan.

6. Integrate deployable intelligence support element capabilities into the analysis.

7. The brigade engineer must work with the S-2 and S-3 to develop an R&S plan to confirm or deny the enemy obstacle template.

8. TF engineers must properly conceal and protect their primary means of obstacle supply (Class V, mines).

9. Task forces must develop a Class IV/V supply point and mine dump SOP for defensive operations.

10. Use brigade or higher level haul assets to transport mines to the mine dump and nodes.

11. Maneuver units must provide support personnel to uncrate, inspect, configure, and transport the mines for emplacement by the engineers.

12. Doctrinal reference: FM 20-32, ***Mine/Countermine Operations***, Chapter 2, pp. 2-33 thru 2-41.

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 4</u>: Combined Arms Obstacle Integration**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-1: Greater unit employment of **nonstandard** complex obstacles in restrictive and very restrictive terrain.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-2: Maneuver staffs and their engineers lack understanding of the integration of natural and reinforcing obstacles with fires to shape the enemy maneuver.

1. Brigades designate belts and intents but do not resource belts with appropriate quantities of Class IV/V.

2. Brigades do not designate directed obstacle groups to support either the brigade deep fight or the brigade decisive point.

3. The brigade does not refine the obstacle plan by preparing consolidated obstacle graphics from task force obstacle plans and by resolving any conflicts in intents (similar to the artillery fire support planning process).

4. Direct and indirect fires are seldom integrated with the obstacle plan at any level.

RESULT: Most of the defensive obstacle emplacement time is consumed by staffs conducting planning.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Plan and execute obstacle integration principles in accordance with FM 90-7, ***Combined Arms Obstacle Integration***.

2. Obstacle belts and groups are planned and designated in order to synchronize the brigade and battalion defensive fight and researched to allow timely acquisition, allocation, and distribution of Class IV/V.

3. A combination of wire, mines, tank ditches, and berms has proven most effective.

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 5</u>: Mine Reporting and Lane Marking**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-1: Units do not take the time to properly mark and report minefields.

1. Actual markings emplaced on enemy minefields are not consistent with unit SOPs.
2. Initial markings are not upgraded with more durable material such as pickets and barbed wire.
3. Minefields that have lanes reduced are not overwatched or subsequently cleared.
4. Units do not routinely mark friendly emplaced minefields, especially FASCAM minefields.
5. Failure to follow procedures for filling out and submitting DA Form 1355 to units responsible for overwatching obstacles containing mines.

RESULT:

1. Friendly forces continue to experience incidents in enemy minefields believed to have lanes reduced.
2. Lack of continual observation creates difficulty in determining whether a minefield has been reseeded by enemy forces or merely improperly swept by friendly forces.
3. Leads to an unclear intelligence picture.
4. Hampers the S-2's attempt to develop enemy patterns.
5. Incidents of fratricide continue to occur as a result of inadequate documentation and improper marking of friendly minefields.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-1: Brigades have placed little emphasis on route status and obstacle tracking by maneuver commanders. Enemy obstacle reporting is poorly managed at all levels.
RESULT: Information pertaining to route and obstacle locations is not disseminated down to subordinate units throughout the brigade.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Brigades must ensure that reporting procedures, specific to route and obstacle locations, are developed and incorporated into existing SOPs.
2. Information received, referencing obstacle and route status, must be disseminated down to all subordinate units.

3. Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision-making process.

- Review TACSOPs.
- Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.

4. Doctrinal reference: FM 5-7-30, ***Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations***, Chapter 2.

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 6</u>: Positioning of Crew-Served Weapons**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>
<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 6-1: Artillery batteries and platoons are not paying attention to detail in positioning crew-served weapons.

1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons.
2. Position restricts movement and operation.
3. Too often the crew-served positions lack interlocking fires.
4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.
5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about **dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.**
6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.
8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons proficiency.

RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battery***, Chapter 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG, p. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire, and, most importantly, positioning crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.

3. Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.

4. Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 7</u>: Battle Tracking/Reporting**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 1 | |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 7-1: Engineer leaders usually lack an established system to track engineer operations.

1. Reporting is untimely and incomplete or inaccurate.
2. Problems are compounded by the lack of communications hardware between the brigade engineer and the task force engineers.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision-making process.
   - Review TACSOPs.
   - Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.

2. Doctrinal reference: FM 5-7-30, ***Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations***, Chapter 2.

**<u>TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 8</u>: Breaching Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 1 | |

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Too many units are not conducting a breach to standard.

1. Commanders and staffs too often do not apply all five breaching tenets.
2. Engineers rarely receive enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL).
3. Task forces neither mass nor synchronize their breach/assault efforts at the objective.
4. Task forces do not conduct effective reverse sequence planning from the objective to local assembly areas.
5. Many elements within the combined arms team do not participate in full-force rehearsals.

**TECHNIQUES**

l. Implement the five breaching tenets:
- Intelligence
- Breaching fundamentals
- Breaching organization
- Mass
- Synchronization

2. Develop and implement a combined arms breach training program in accordance with FM 90-13-1, ***Combined Arms Breaching Operations***, Chapter 7.

**TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 9: Improve BSA Defense**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |

1

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 9-1: Base defense is a primary mission for combat service support (CSS) units; however, they do not do it very well.

1. Base defense is the painful process by which soldiers can increase their chances of surviving. Even so, it is neglected.
2. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the set has been completed, it will take less soldiers to maintain.

RESULT: Solid base defense will help CSS soldiers survive, thus increasing, if not sustaining, effective and efficient support to the customers.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Base defense must be factored into the service support equation.
2. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation and prior to getting totally immersed in providing support.
3. NCOs, as the doers, must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.
4. Review the JRTC “Defense of the BSA” video tape. See ordering information at the back of this publication.
5. Forward support battalions (FSBs) and tenant units should conduct combined security sweeps and establish hasty security to receive the main body.
6. Begin to establish the brigade support area (BSA) commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.
7. Continue to improve and upgrade the defense based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).
8. Ensure all units and soldiers within the BSA are familiar with the FSB’s TSOP.
9. Maximize use of available weapon systems to enhance the defense of BSA tenants. (For example, integrate tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFVs] into the plan. If a tank is waiting for mobility parts but the gun system functions, that tank can be factored into a static defense plan.)
10. The CSS soldier has to provide support while at the same time work on base defense. These actions compete for the same resource--in this instance, the soldier. It requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.

## TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

### TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Supply/Resupply Operations

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | | 2 |

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Medical supplies often reach critical stockage levels because clinical staff and medical supply personnel fail to coordinate efforts.
RESULT: Medical supplies are used and a several day lag time results for operational input which is often impossible to make up.

PROBLEM 1-2: Units are still experiencing difficulties with LOGPAC operations.
RESULT: Infantry battalion logistical planners are not planning 24, 48, and 72 hours out. For success, they must synchronize their LOGPACs with the battalion's tactical operations.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Medical staff personnel need to circulate through wards to check on supply levels, and clinical personnel need to gain a better understanding of the time necessary to obtain supplies through the normal requisitioning system.
2. Commanders need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the impact of their operations on the entire hospital system.
3. Battle-track in the field and combat trains to stay abreast of friendly and enemy unit locations and ongoing operations being conducted by their battalions.
4. Support platoon leaders must utilize the forward support battalion S-2 and their own battalion S-2 to track the enemy threat, specifically minefield locations.

### TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: CSS Integration

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Brigade and FSB logisticians experience significant difficulty coordinating Army aviation for logistics from the brigade support area (BSA) to forward units.

1. Aviation is rarely used to move material from the BSA to the forward units. Often, neither the brigade nor the aviation battalion allocate aircraft for aerial resupply.

2. When aircraft are allocated, units fail to prioritize loads, establish PZ/LZ controls, and maximize backhaul capabilities.

RESULT: The effect of aerial resupply operation as a combat multiplier is degraded.

PROBLEM 2-2: There are frequent failures to effectively use the Standard Army Maintenance System version (SAMS-2) to manage maintenance and track readiness. Failure to transmit outgoing maintenance data real-time to the Division Material Maintenance Center (DMMC) using the material support element (MSE), the tactical terminal adapter (TTA), the digital network voice telephone (DNVT), and/or other electronic means.

1. Reference publications are often not available.

2. The SAMS-2 system operator does not perform prevention maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the SAMS-2 system.

PROBLEM 2-3: Maintenance units have difficulty understanding the concept of maintenance in operations other than war. One aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) is assigned responsibility for maintenance of all the attached assets, normally three or four different types of airframes.

RESULTS:

1. Difficulties in unifying the maintenance effort.

2. Poor status reporting to the task force commander.

3. Higher not-mission-capable maintenance (NMCM) and nonmission-capable supply (NMCS) rates.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 2-4: Units are still experiencing difficulties with LOGPAC operations.

RESULT: Infantry battalion logistical planners are not planning 24, 48, and 72 hours out. For success, they must synchronize their LOGPACs with the battalion's tactical operations.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The brigade must develop and implement a system for requesting and allocating aviation for logistics.

2. Allocations should be prioritized and listed in the tasks to subordinate units of the brigade order to clearly delineate responsibilities.

3. Transportation support must be integrated into the overall CSS plan to ensure support and supplies arrive where needed, when needed.

4. The transportation support plan must consider and integrate Air Force airlift, Army aviation, and ground transportation assets into the concept of support for the ground tactical plan.

5. Synchronize the transportation plan with subordinate and supported units' plans.

6. References:
- MTP 63-216, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
- FM 100-13, ***Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.***
- FM 90-4, ***Air Assault Operations***.

7. Battle-track in the field and combat trains to stay abreast of friendly and enemy unit locations and ongoing operations being conducted by their battalions.

8. Support platoon leaders must utilize the forward support battalion S-2 and their own battalion S-2 to track the enemy threat, specifically minefield locations.

**<u>TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 3</u>: Ammunition (AMMO) Management**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |

1

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 3-1: Units are not adequately managing and controlling ammunition.

1. Units do not plan ammunition in volleys.
2. Ammunition tracking is deficient. Ammunition counts at batteries, battalion TOC, and battalion ALOC often widely differ.
3. Ammunition resupply is often prepackaged prior to D-Day. Little planning for follow-on missions.
4. Resupply plans frequently rely on only one means of delivery. If weather or the enemy eliminate that means, units are slow to develop alternatives.

RESULTS:

1. Units have insufficient ammunition to meet commander's guidance for fire support.
2. Infantry companies initiate attacks with insufficient ammunition to meet the desired attack criteria.

**TECHNIQUES**

l. The brigade FSO:
- **Identifies** ammunition requirements for the brigade and battalion fights.
- Allocates volleys to meet the commander's desired effects on enemy forces.
- **Estimates requirements for future** operations.

2. The FA battalion S3:
- Refines the FSO's requirements.
- Identifies the amount of ammunition for gunnery needs (registration and calibration) and counterfire efforts.
- Tracks and controls the expenditure of the ammunition.

3. The FA battalion XO:
   - Identifies ammunition resources.
   - Plans and coordinates all resupply operations (consider use of multiple means).
   - Monitors consumption.
   - Anticipates future requirements.

4. The brigade FSCOORD: Monitors the process and identifies shortfall to the brigade commander.

5. For mortar ammunition:
   - The battalion FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion commander and S-3 to assign priorities for mortar fire.
   - FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion XO and S-4 to ensure both the battalion and company mortars are resupplied with sufficient ammunition to accomplish the commander's intent.

6. Develop an ammunition transfer point (ATP) layout plan based on quantity/distance tables.
   - Set up the ATP according to the layout plan to ensure safety and security.
   - Include a generic plan in the unit's TACSOP.

7. Cache fuel assets throughout the assembly area to reduce the likelihood of all assets being destroyed.

8. Establish silent and/or jump FARPs prior to offensive or defensive operations.

9. Plan ammunition in volleys:
   - Calculate the number of volleys required to accomplish the mission.
   - Allocate ammunition by volleys.

10. Doctrinal reference: FM 9-13, ***Munitions Support in Theater of Operations***; FM 9-6, ***Ammunition Handbook: A Guide for Ammunition Specialists***, Chapter 2; and quantity/distance tables.

**<u>TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 4</u>: Maintenance**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |

2

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-1: Units are not coordinating maintenance and Class IX support well.

PROBLEM 4-2: Units do not establish and implement SOP for preventative maintenance in the field. This is highlighted by the failure to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988.

RESULTS:

1. Parts are not ordered.
2. Increased downtime for weapons systems.
3. Low materiel readiness status.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Use the SAMS-2 system as the primary tool for maintenance and supply management.
2. Conduct supervisor and operator training on the various methods for transferring SAMS-2 data.
3. Coordinate with the DMMC prior to deployment to prevent communications difficulties.
4. References:
   - FM 63-20, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
   - FM 100-10, ***Combat Service Support***.
   - AR 750-1, ***Army Materiel Maintenance Policies***.
   - SAMS-2 Users Guide, ADSM 18-L26-AHO-BUR-UM.
5. Establish SOP for preventative maintenance in the field that includes completion of DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988, submission and collection process/method, and action and return of parts to equipment operator.
6. Review Maintenance Management, Update 14, and Unit Supply, Update 14.

**<u>TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 5</u>: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 1 | 2 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-1: The task organization for the forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) is often unclear. Significant confusion between the forward support medical company, the combat support hospital, and the aviation task force.
RESULT: Creates $C^2$ problems that hinder the effectiveness of the forward support MEDEVAC team.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-2: Many CSS units do not have a plan to evacuate casualties.

1. The large majority view casualty evacuation as a simple process that can be developed and executed while casualties are happening.

2. Even when units do have a plan, it has not been rehearsed and during execution proves to be ineffective. When the plan works, it usually cannot accommodate the continuous influx of casualties.

3. This is attributed to the dangerously low number of combat lifesavers and medics available to help.

4. What units need to understand is that casualty evacuation is an event that will use resources normally used for other purposes.

RESULTS:

1. There are a high number of died of wounds (DOWs) in these units.

2. Most units do not analyze and fail to realize what it takes to properly render assistance and effectively remove their casualties from the battlefield.

3. Even the best evacuation plans cannot account for massive number of casualties.

4. Qualified medical help can maintain soldiers alive while the evacuation plan gets to them.

5. Transportation is one of the most critical commodities for CSS units and, as such, has to be managed. The use of those assets has to be factored into the overall plan so when the time comes those resources will be available.

PROBLEM 5-3: Expeditious loading and evacuation of casualties is the single most important element in reducing the number of DOW on the battlefield today.

1. Units fail to recognize that medical personnel alone cannot accomplish this mission.

2. Units are failing to augment teams with nonmedical personnel and/or failing to adequately train team members so that evacuation platforms can be rapidly loaded and/or unloaded.

RESULT: Use of nonstandard means of evacuation is increasingly being employed; litter teams are still slowing the process of evacuation.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Commanders need to emphasize that patient evacuation is not a medical mission but rather a unit mission.

2. Casualty evacuation has to be part of the plan and rehearsed in order to be successful.

3. Proper resource allocation and enough first aid qualified personnel translates into higher readiness level.

4. Medical personnel should be used to supervise litter teams, but their expertise is better put to use in treatment of casualties than in the actual carrying of litters.

5. All unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques, and rotating rosters should be established to have personnel on call for litter team duty.

6. Establish a clear command relationship for the FSMT prior to deployment.

7. Train with that established relationship prior to deployment.

**<u>TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 6</u>: Combat Health Services**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |

2

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 6-1: Poor site selection prevents medical companies from conducting smooth and efficient patient treatment and evacuation.
RESULTS:

1. The lack of space inhibits proper dispersion of equipment.
2. Does not facilitate establishing patient bunkers or fighting positions.

PROBLEM 6-2: Medical equipment sets are not being properly packed.

1. Some medications are still in bulk packaging and are not placed in medical chests.
2. Most of the medical equipment chests lacked the appropriate Class VIII.
3. Chest drawers are not labeled.
4. Units are storing expired medications.
5. Units are not using quality control and surveillance records for TOE Medical Assemblies, DA Form 9998.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Conduct a training exercise without troops (TEWT) on site selection with key leaders from the medical company and battalion staff.
2. Reference: FM 8-10-1, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Medical Company***, Paragraph 3-3, and FM 63-20, ***Forward Support Battalion***, Chapter 2.
3. Develop an internal Class VIII SOP that outlines accountability, setup, and maintenance procedures for both garrison and field operations.
4. References:
   - AR 40-61.
   - ARTEP 8-263-30-MTP.
   - DA PAM 710-2-1.
   - FM 8-10-1, para 1-12.
   - FM 8-10-4, ***Medical Platoon Leaders Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***, para 5-24.
   - FM 8-10-9, ***Combat Health Logistics in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***.
   - FM 8-55, ***Planning for Health Services Support***, Chapter 6, Sections III and IV.

**<u>TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 7</u>: Civil Affairs Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| 4QFY96 1QFY97 2-3QFY97 | 1 | 1 |

PROBLEM 7-1: Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield.

1. Too often units allow civilians free access to the position area.
2. Subordinate elements frequently call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Battalions usually take an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with the civilians.

RESULTS:

1. Disruption of unit activities.
2. Friendly or neutral civilians are too often unnecessarily angered by procedures and the treatment they receive as a result of units trying to figure out the proper disposition.
3. Too free an access, however, allows neutral or anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the $C^2$ nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).
4. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a “white/gray/black” list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians.
2. Develop clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian, as well as those civilians who do not appear on any list.
3. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians -- train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with civilians on the battlefield at Home Station.

## TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

### TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 3 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Aviation task forces fail to systematically pass intelligence to the companies. Companies seldom develop a system to pull the intelligence from the task force S-2.
RESULTS: Failing to have current enemy troop and AD locations.

PROBLEM 1-2: Air defense fire units continue to suffer substantial casualties which are primarily caused by a lack of battle tracking and situational awareness.

1. Inaccurate information concerning air defense team locations.
2. Actual team locations differ from those posted on the ADO's maps despite clearance of fires battle drills conducted at brigade and battalion level.
3. Current minefield tracking charts, usually available at brigade and battalion TOCs, are not considered when planning Stinger and Avenger moves.

RESULTS:

1. Fratricides caused by friendly indirect fire systems.
2. Stinger and Avenger teams suffer an inordinate amount of casualties from known friendly and enemy minefields.

PROBLEM 1-3: Signal operations planning and battle tracking are not timely or accurate.

1. Too many signal units do not maintain the status of communications.
2. Failure to routinely report status to higher headquarters.
3. Too many signal leaders do not track the status of expendable supplies (batteries) or Class IX repair parts.

RESULTS: Battalion signal sections too often do not know the locations of their supporting signal assets to include RAUs and retrans teams.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: (Repeat of Problem 1-2).

PROBLEM 1-5: Air mission commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions.

PROBLEM 1-6: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.
RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

**TECHNIQUES**

1. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs).
2. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (main CP, combat trains CP, and field trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information. Include this information in the unit SOP for command post operations.
3. S-2 provides companies an intelligence update twice daily.
4. S-2 briefs aircrews prior to each mission.
5. ADOs at brigade and battalion levels must ensure that their battle tracking is current and accurate.
6. Use communications procedures, status charts, and tracking tools effectively to keep the ADO situationally aware of the entire battlefield.
7. Track, disseminate, and update locations of supporting signal assets.
8. Develop a standard battle tracking report that includes all equipment and expendables.
9. Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At Home Station, units should attempt to conduct cross-training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 2**: **Communication and Signal Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Many commanders and battle staff cannot perform such basic tasks as install, operate, and maintain tactical FAXs, SINCGARS FM, SINCGARS remotes and MSRTs/DNVTs. These tasks and the rerouting of information over alternative means of communications are often delegated to the brigade signal officer and communications section.
RESULT: Disruption of priority of work, planning, and crew tasks the signal officer and his personnel.

PROBLEM 2-2: Signal operations within the brigade task force often become desynchronized with little or no cross-talk between signalers.
RESULT: After insertion into the brigade AO, the task force signalers often completely lose track of each other.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 2-3: Brigades have experienced difficulty in using tactical local area network during operations at JRTC.
RESULT: Laptop computers have not had the required software and device drivers to access TACLAN.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Conduct Home-Station user/operator training and certification to improve and sustain individual skills consistent with current doctrine.
2. Make sure that TOC/TAC communications battle drills include at least the installation of Combat Net Radio (CNR) assets, MSE user equipment, and how to use redundant/backup communications means (i.e., "what to do when primary communications fails").
3. The command and staff must "familiarize, zero, and qualify" with their assigned individual communications equipment in order to effectively master the art of staff coordination, information management, and overall brigade task force command and control.
4. Doctrinal references:
   - FM 7-30, ***The Infantry Brigade***.
   - FM 24-1, ***Signal Support in the AirLand Battle***.
5. Develop and implement a system for subordinate signalers to pass information.
6. Conduct daily meetings while still at the ISB and a method to communicate in the field (MSE conference calls, separate communication net, tactical LAN/WAN, meeting at TOCs, etc.) that implements a daily report to higher headquarters (FAX or data) and a voice connection to discuss areas of concern (conference call or FM net).
7. Brigades need to acquire the appropriate software and supporting equipment in order to effectively utilize this system.

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Battle Staff Planning and Mission Analysis**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Battalion staffs are having difficulty planning for future operations while executing current operations. FA battalion staffs are not routinely integrated into a disciplined, structured planning process.
RESULT: The S-3 fails to maximize specific functional area expertise, and the plan is rarely synchronized.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-2: Brigade fire support elements need to ensure that they are integrated into signal specific issues within the TOC. Specifically, FSEs at brigade level do not receive updates referencing frequency changes, TEK changeover, and SOI changes implemented by the BSO.
RESULT: The FSE experiences difficulty in executing their assigned mission.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Develop and practice using SOPs for the planning process. Address the roles and responsibilities for each individual involved in the process.
2. Facilitate a more coordinated and synchronized parallel-planning process. Prepare a list of FA questions for a member of the battalion staff who participates in the brigade planning process.
3. Post timelines and adhere to them.
4. The BSO must assume ownership of the FSE and ensure the FSE is aware of any changes inherent to signal operations in the brigade.

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Rehearsals**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 2 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted.
1. Too many units simply **talk through** the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal.
2. Commanders and S-3s do not:
   - Deliberately plan for rehearsals and, therefore, do not prepare for rehearsals.
   - Focus on key events.

- Address branches and sequels.
- Involve all key leaders and BOS representatives.
- Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist.
- Adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation.
- Publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.

PROBLEM 4-2: Fire support element rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.

1. The rehearsals do not practice or test the plan.
2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal.
3. Most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-3: The forward support battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

1. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is usually not used.
2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.
3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.
4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:
   - Personnel not familiar with the SOP do not follow the SOP.
   - Never execute the procedure to verify whether the written SOP works or not.
5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.
   - OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.
   - Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.
6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.
2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.
3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

PROBLEM 4-4: Once units depart the intermediate staging base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation. Fire supporters are not integrated into the “maneuver” rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, ***The Infantry Battalion***, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list. Rehearsal techniques listed in FM 6-20-1, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion***, are not being used.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Conduct confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD.
   - Standard format.
   - The battalion staff must attend.

2. Do not use backbriefs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan.

3. Rehearsals must be properly planned and prepared.
   - Ensure the entire staff is present.
   - Do not sacrifice rehearsals because of time.

4. Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to ensure that all BOS are covered.

5. When sufficient time is available, there is no substitute for a full-force rehearsal from battalion down to platoon leader level.

6. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
   - Concentrate on key events.
   - Ensure that the SOP tests and practices the plan against enemy actions and reactions.
   - Ensure contingencies are addressed and branches and sequels rehearsed.

7. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal.
   - Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.
   - The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.

8. A thorough SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home-Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals and should include the essential elements of a rehearsal.

9. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

10. Rely on the MDMP to:
    - Develop the plan.
    - Publish a good operations order.
    - Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.
    - Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.

11. Doctrinal references:
    - FM 7-20, ***The Infantry Battalion.***
    - FM 6-20-1, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion***.
    - FM 63-20, ***Forward Support Battalion.***
    - MTP 63-216, ***Forward Support Battalion.***
    - CGSC ST 101-5, ***Command and Staff Decision Processes***.

12. Other references: CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, Apr 91, ***Rehearsals***; FM 7-8, ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***, Chapter 2; FM 7-10, ***The Infantry Rifle Company***, Chapters 2, 4, 5-7.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 5</u>: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-1: Forward support battalions frequently establish forward command posts (CPs) either as part of a forward logistic element (FLE) or when moving a brigade support area (BSA).

1. Roles and responsibilities between the forward CP and the main CP are frequently undefined.
2. The forward CPs do not have or use SOPs for organization, assembly, security, and command, control, and communications ($C^3$).
3. Forward CP personnel are often unaware or unsure of their duties and are unable to control the logistics battle or battle-track brigade operations.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-2: Brigades do not have the procedures incorporated into the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) that address the specifics inherent to TOC vs TAC operations. They have failed to develop any criteria that determines when the TAC has control of the battle.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The FSB should develop an SOP for the forward CP to ensure continuous, responsive combat service support when moving the brigade support area (BSA) or employing a forward logistic element (FLE).
   - Define the relationship between the forward CP and the main CP.
   - Include standards for the forward command post's capabilities and its employment.
   - Describe the roles and responsibilities for organization, assembly, security, $C^3$, and personnel.
2. Rehearse the newly developed SOP during Home-Station training to gain and maintain proficiency.
3. Doctrinal references:
   - FM 63-20, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
   - MTP 63-216, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
   - CGSC ST 101-5, ***Command and Staff Decision Processes***.
4. Brigades must determine what conditions must exist for this to occur. Examples are: all nets inherent to the TAC are operational and the TAC is in position to monitor and track the battle.

5. During wargaming and synchronization, brigade staffs must determine the necessity to employ a TAC. Considerations include, but are not limited to, the need to place $C^2$ at a specific point to influence the battle, the need to have redundant communications, and the current threat.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 6</u>: Course-of-Action Development and Wargaming**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 6-1: The greatest shortfall in the planning process is the inability to synchronize the task force because of inadequate wargaming.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 6-2: Brigades have not thoroughly developed approved courses of action to the level of detail needed to execute wargaming and synchronization. The brigades begin the MDMP already having an OPLAN developed to address their initial entry and mission. While this can serve as an advantage in the interest of time, staffs have not developed courses of action in detail.
RESULTS:

1. Movement tables, convoy density, and ACLs specific to airland and air assault operations are not developed until the actual wargaming and synchronization begin.
2. This confuses the wargaming process and does not allow the staff to totally focus on synchronizing the plan.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Array the unit's combat power (two levels down) and array the enemy (event template two levels down).
2. Wargame thoroughly using the action-reaction-counteraction methodology.
3. Conduct detailed analysis of each BOS element.
4. Conduct a formal wargame brief for the commander (critical if he did not participate in the process).
5. Brigade staffs must develop approved courses of action prior to initiating the wargaming and synchronization process to maximize synchronization.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 7</u>: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 4 | 3 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 7-1: The forward support battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

1. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is usually not used.
2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.
3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.
4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:
   - Personnel not familiar with the SOP do not follow the SOP.
   - Never use the procedures in the SOP to verify whether they work or not.
5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.
   - OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.
   - Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.
6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.
2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.
3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

PROBLEM 7-2: Battalions generally plan well during the initial planning process at Home Station or the ISB. However, as battalion commanders and staffs begin to experience battlefield friction and stress, proficiency in executing the MDMP diminishes.

1. Mission analysis:
   - Seldom develop comprehensive estimates for the CS and CSS staff elements.
   - Poor time management.
2. Commander's guidance: Often inconsistent, incomprehensive, and lacking detail.
3. Course-of-action analysis and wargaming:
   - Battalion staffs consistently fail to follow the eight steps of the wargaming process.
   - Staffs seldom develop force ratios needed to assess the results of the action-reaction-counteraction methodology.

4. Decision-making in a time-constrained environment:
   - Battalion staffs tend to be less integrated in a time-constrained environment.
   - Battle staffs skip steps in the MDMP rather than modifying each step based upon time available.

RESULTS:

1. Staff planning quality generally degrades as battlefield friction increases.
2. This results in poorly synchronized plans.

PROBLEMS 7-3: Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.

1. The staffs do not have a clear understanding of the process and the linkage between the steps.
2. The few senior officers who understand the process generally focus on other issues.
3. Often the executive officer focuses on logistical issues, not ST 101-5 staff "leadership" requirements, while the S-3 is fighting the current fight. Units should train as a staff at Home Station to become proficient in all areas of the decision-making process prior to their training rotation.

PROBLEM 7-4: Company-level estimate of the situation is not done well.

1. Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.
2. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
3. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the military decision-making process (MDMP).
4. Poor time management.
5. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 7-5: (Same as 4-3).

PROBLEM 7-6: (Same as 7-3).

PROBLEM 7-7: Brigades have not effectively integrated heavy LNOs into the military decision-making process (MDMP). As a result, the capabilities and limitations of heavy assets inherent to the brigade task force are not thoroughly understood.

RESULT: Normally, heavy units deploy to JRTC separate from light organizations and are not present during the initial planning process. Due to this fact, heavy integration becomes an afterthought.

## TECHNIQUES

1. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.
2. Rely on the MDMP to:
   - Develop the plan.
   - Publish a good operations order.
   - Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.
   - Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.
3. Battalion commanders must see the requirement to conduct Home-Station training on MDMP with full staff.
4. Battalion XOs must ensure all members of the battle staff are incorporated in the mission analysis.
5. Consider available time from the receipt of the initial warning order to mission execution.
6. Identify critical events that must occur in staff planning and within each battle operating system.
7. Commander's guidance should be given for each battle operating system.
8. Remember: ***Clear, concise commander's guidance is most important when the tempo of tactical operations increases to minimize the degradation of staff planning quality associated with battlefield friction and stress***.
9. The battalion XO must ensure the process remains objective as the S-2 and S-3 fight the enemy and friendly course(s) of action.
10. Use every available Home-Station training opportunity to train as a staff in order to enhance proficiency in all areas of the decision-making process.
11. Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.
12. Develop preprinted, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in the field:
    - Mission analysis worksheet
    - COA sketch sheets
    - Blank timeline
    - Warning order format
    - FRAGO format
13. Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff with each responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis:
    - Developing a COA.
    - Wargaming the COA.
    - Writing an annex to the FRAGO.
14. Brigade staffs must ensure that heavy LNOs are incorporated into the MDMP and must aggressively seek to integrate them into the process.
15. Heavy unit LNOs link up with supported units at the unit’s Home Station and deploy with the brigade staff to JRTC.

16. Doctrinal references:
    - FM 101-5, Aug 96, ***Staff Organization and Operation***, Final Draft.
    - FM 63-20, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
    - MTP 63-216, ***Forward Support Battalion***.
    - CGSC ST 101-5, ***Command and Staff Decision Processes***.
17. Other references:
    - CALL Newsletter 95-12, Dec 95, ***Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning***."
    - CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, ***Tactical Operations Center***, for additional detail about techniques and procedure on how to successfully employ the military decision-making process (MDMP).

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 8: Staff Synchronization**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 4 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Battalion commanders frequently fail to use the XO as the principle agent for integrating coordinating and special staffs into a **battle staff** capable of operating as a team during the military decision-making process (MDMP) and mission execution. Units that have not developed and trained as a combined staff often ignore several staff officers (such as civil affairs, psychological operations, S-1, S-4, EN, ADO, BALO and SALTO) in staff estimates and orders development.

PROBLEM 8-2: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without understanding the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.
2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.
3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 8-3: Synchronization of breaching fundamentals.

1. Insufficient coordination and integration between task organized units.
2. Combined arms **rock drill rehearsals** at brigade and battalion level often exclude key BOS representation.
3. Failure to achieve full-scale rehearsals at company team and below.

RESULTS:

1. Extended amount of time on target.
2. Unsynchronized execution.
3. Execution shortcomings such as timid and untimely deployment of forces, exposed flanks, no obscuration, and no attempt to secure the far side of unopposed point obstacles are common.

2-3QY97

PROBLEM 8-4: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without an understanding of the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.
2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.
3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 8-5: As the brigade's subject matter experts for combat health support operations, the forward support medical company commander and the brigade surgeon are not properly integrated into the brigade staff.
RESULT: A CHS plan that lacks proper and timely coordination, synchronization, and dissemination. Overall, the CHS plan becomes reactive instead of proactive.

PROBLEM 8-6: Brigade task forces have experienced difficulty in employing heavy teams during MOUT. Heavy units do not understand the complexity of MOUT, and brigade staffs do not understand how to effectively utilize heavy units during MOUT. Fire control measures needed to prevent fratricide have not been planned in detail.

PROBLEM 8-7: Synchronization of attacks in built-up areas.

1. Although units typically do well inside buildings, they are much less successful at coordinating the efforts of units outside and between buildings.
2. Units generally disregard the synchronization of direct fires, indirect fires, and obscuration, often in the belief that "MOUT is a squad leader's fight."
3. Units lack a detailed direct fire plan.
4. Units fail to weight the main effort through restricting responsibility or adding combat power.
5. Lack of a plan by units to suppress and obscure enemy positions to allow movement.
6. Units exhibit tactical impatience, resulting in movement to a new building before the conditions have been set.

RESULT:

1. The result is a large number of friendly casualties and the loss of tactical momentum.

2. On average, units suffer twice as many casualties moving between buildings as they do in the close fight within buildings.

## TECHNIQUES

1. XO must integrate the entire battle staff into the MDMP and information management.

2. Battalion SOPs must establish clear and separate task lists for each TOC member or BOS and be formatted as checklists or battle drills.

3. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.

4. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.

5. During Home-Station training, conduct classes on the air tasking order (ATO), airspace control order (ACO), special instructions (SPINS), and $A^2C^2$ operations IAW FM 100-103.

6. Integrate the medical company commander and brigade surgeon into the brigade staff planning process for CHS operations.

7. Ensure that the combat health support officer (CHSO), the brigade signal officer, and a representative from the forward MEDEVAC support team become involved in the CHS planning process.

8. The brigade S-1 should schedule CHS wargaming, coordination meetings, and rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline.

9. The CHS planner must provide the command with a CHS estimate to be used as a basis for the CHS plan, which is developed by the brigade S-1 and the other CHS planners in the brigade.

10. The CHS planners should develop a single CHS graphic (cartoon) showing the position of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes and planning, and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.

11. The brigade should include the CHS graphic with the brigade operations order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the CHS plan.

12. Brigade staffs must conduct leader professional development training with heavy team leaders to completely understand how to employ heavy forces during MOUT.

13. Detailed planning to address fire control measures and issues must be incorporated into plans developed for MOUT.

14. Doctrinal reference: FM 8-55, ***Planning for Health Services Support.***

15. Other references:

- CALL CTC Bulletin No. 90-3, May 90, ***The Stone Forest (A Heavy/Light Combat Narrative.***
- CALL Newsletter No. 93-8, Dec, 93, ***Peace Operations, Vol IV, Operations other than War***, Chapter II.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 9</u>: Troop Leading**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 9-1: Battle captains and battle NCOs are not proficient in orchestrating staff battle drills. Staffs rarely train at Home Station on how to execute staff battle drills.
RESULTS:

1. Unnecessarily large amount of reaction time required for the staff to deal with certain foreseeable situations.
2. Too many brigades lose their ability to stay **within the enemy's decision cycle**.

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 9-2: (Same as Problem 5-2).

PROBLEM 9-3: The MI company leadership does not rigidly enforce the basic tenets of troop-leading procedures (TLPs) during operations. Rehearsals are not stressed by the company leadership, and little planning time is dedicated to contingency planning for $C^2$, reporting criteria, and actions on contact.
RESULT:

1. The result is poorly planned missions which lack integration into the tactical scheme of maneuver.
2. The factors of METT-T are rarely considered, particularly in preparation for ground surveillance (GS) and human intelligence (HUMINT) team missions.
3. Teams often deploy without basic mission-essential equipment items such as radios, maps, etc.
4. Coordination with attached and/or supported units is poorly executed.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Use every possible Home-Station training opportunity to develop and refine battle staff procedures and drills.
2. Train the principal staff on the "how to" of concurrently planning for future operations while still executing current operations.
3. Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and

coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission-essential equipment items required for particular missions.

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 10: Information Management**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 10-1: Aviation task forces fail to systematically pass intelligence to the companies. Companies seldom develop a system to pull the intelligence from the task force S-2.
RESULTS: Failing to have current enemy troop and AD locations.

PROBLEM 10-2: Brigade task force compromise plans are generally not well-thought-out, comprehensive, or rehearsed.

1. Most units plan to jump their Julian dates up or down on the FH FM nets because alternate net IDs have **not been established and/or published**.
2. A SINCGARS time change from Julian date GPS Zulu or alternate net ID **is only a temporary fix** (long enough to correct the reason for change) to deny enemy access to **compromised nets**. Once all nets are on the adjusted time, a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover **must be initiated**.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 10-3: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.
RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

**TECHNIQUES**

1. S-2 provides companies an intelligence update twice daily.
2. S-2 briefs aircrews prior to each mission.
3. Although manually distributing COMSEC/SOI changes is an **acceptable** method, a more **preferred** method is to implement all COMSEC/SOI management and compromise procedures using electronic key transfer, i.e., FM over-the-air-rekey (OTAR) and/or MSE bulk/individual variable transfer. Incorporate the OTAR method of distribution into the brigade's SINCGARS CNR sustainment training program.

4. To further protect codes during periods of suspected compromise:

• Request authentication and encryption tables and ensure that operators are trained on their use.

• If changing Julian dates, move all nets to the new Julian date to ensure communications on the combined arms battlefield.

5. Initiate a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover after all nets are on an alternate Net ID or adjusted time.

6. Doctrinal reference: See FM 11-32, ***Combat Net Radio (CNR) Operations***, for building SINCGARS SOPs.

7. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs): priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs).

8. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (main CP, combat trains CP, and field trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 11</u>: Air Liaison Officer Operations**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 1 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 11-1: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without understanding the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.

2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.

3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 11-2: Integration between assault and attack aviation rarely exists during operations. A very minimum of interface occurs between aircrews of different companies.

PROBLEM 11-3: The aviation liaison officer often does not understand his role within the brigade $A^2C^2$ element. He often fails to provide the information needed to ensure airspace deconfliction. Frequently, the air liaison neglects to provide information which promotes the development of situational awareness, especially within the AD arena (both ground-to-air and air-to-ground engagements).

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 11-4: Air mission commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.
2. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.
3. Train at Home Station with attached units.
4. Conduct rehearsals to identify problems and ensure synchronization.
5. Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At Home Station, units should attempt to conduct cross-training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.
6. Doctrinal references:
   - FM 100-103, Oct 87, ***Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone***.
   - CALL Handbook No. 92-3, Apr 92, ***Fratricide Risk Assessment for Company Leadership***.
   - CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, Apr 92, ***Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.***,

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 12: Time Management**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 12-1: During the deliberate planning process, there is generally an absence of parallel planning between the battery commander and his platoon leaders. There is a shortage of planning time at platoon level.
RESULTS:

1. Platoon leaders often fail to develop and issue effective OPORDs to their teams.
2. Impedes the platoon leader's ability to integrate and synchronize his planning with that of the supported unit.

PROBLEM 12-2: Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted. Too many units simply **talk through** the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal. Commanders and S-3s do not:

- Deliberately plan for rehearsals and therefore do not prepare for rehearsals.
- Focus on key events.
- Address branches and sequels.
- Involve all key leaders and BOS representatives.
- Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist.
- Adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation.
- Publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 12-3: Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.

1. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
2. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the military decision-making process (MDMP).
3. Poor time management.
4. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Issuing a warning order after each of the brigade's key planning events (mission analysis brief, COA decision brief, wargaming, etc.) will ensure that subordinate leaders will have adequate time and information to conduct their troop-leading procedures.
2. Conduct confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD.
   - Standard format.
   - The battalion staff must attend.
3. Do not use backbriefs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan.
4. Rehearsals must be properly planned and prepared.
   - Ensure the entire staff is present.
   - Do not sacrifice rehearsals because of time.
5. Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to ensure that all BOS are covered.
6. Concentrate on key events.
7. Establish and adhere to a battle rhythm and incorporate it into the unit SOP.
8. Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process. ***Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.***
9. Strive for the execution of all events at the prescribed time.
10. Ensure all tasks that lead to the generation of FRAGOs that focus future operations are accomplished.
11. Set agendas for all events.

12. Focus on updating estimates.
13. Provide visibility on significant acts.
14. Integrate the battle staff and TOC shift.
15. References:
    - FM 7-8, Apr 92, ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***, Chapter 2.
    - FM 7-10, Dec 90, ***The Infantry Rifle Company***, Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.
    - CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, Apr 91, ***Rehearsals***.
    - CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, May 97, Update, ***Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning***."

**TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 13: Incomplete/Inaccurate Estimates**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 13-1: (Same as Problem 1-6).

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 31-2: There is poor utilization of the analysis control element (ACE). SALUTE reports are being passed to the commander with little or no analysis.
RESULTS: Where analysis is attempted, it is usually of poor quality and lacks the necessary details to be useful to the commander. In essence, this information is only of general benefit to the commander.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. Maintain a set battle rhythm for the staff.
2. Conduct staff updates/staff huddles.
3. Conduct commander's conference calls with staff in attendance.
4. Standardize staff journals.
5. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of ASAS.
6. Use ASAS to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, only a few of its capabilities.
7. Incorporate communications and dissemination to the ACE as part of the ACT battle rhythm.

8. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the AO but within the area of interest (AI). The analysts working the ACE are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases.

9. Develop a tracking system for managing incoming message traffic:
   - CCIR
   - Combat power
   - Planning guidance
   - Significant activities

10. Analyze all information received from subordinate and higher units for completeness.
11. Track follow-up RFIs to complete outstanding actions.
12. Enforce existing unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs).

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 14</u>: Orders Development and Processing**

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 14-1: (Same as Problem 12-1).

<u>2-3QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 14-2: Task-organizing military police (MP) units is usually not done well in the order development.

1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.
2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and checkpoints to man that are in close proximity to maneuver units in the same sector.

RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measures are difficult to manage, which has led to problems with fratricide.

PROBLEM 14-3: Units are not getting the right personnel involved in the CHS planning and are not developing a plan to support sustained operations.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Issuing a warning order after each of the brigade's key planning events (mission analysis brief, COA decision brief, wargaming, etc.) will ensure that subordinate leaders will have adequate time and information to conduct their troop-leading procedures.
2. To develop a successful combat health support plan, the medical company commander, combat health support officer, brigade S-1, and brigade surgeon must all be involved in developing the plan.
3. During the brigade's course-of-action development, the combat health support (CHS) plan must be incorporated.
4. Units must use effective CHS rehearsals, matrices, and CHS cartoons on the concept of support.
5. Units can improve their evacuation process by using C-130s for the backhaul of routine and priority patients.
6. Task-organize MP units conducting operations under maneuver battalions.

### TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 15: Commander's Guidance

| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 1QFY97 | 2-3QFY97 |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 |

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 15-1: The commander's guidance for fire support is frequently vague.
1. It does not focus fire support assets and is unsupportable with available fire support assets.
2. Commanders are using nonstandard terminology.
3. Improper use of standard terminology.

RESULT: Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 15-2: (Same as Problem 15-1).

PROBLEM 15-3: Most commanders are using the format of FM 6-71 when writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method, and End State.
1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.

2. Some FSOs use the terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass incorrectly.
RESULT: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

**TECHNIQUES**

1. FM 6-71, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander***, p. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their fire support officers (FSOs). FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.

2. FM 6-20-10, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process***, states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct, and that fire support assets are available to achieve his attack guidance.

3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.

**<u>TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 16</u>: Precombat Checks**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY96 | |
| | <u>1QFY97</u> | <u>2-3QFY97</u> |
| | 2 | |

4QFY96
<u>1QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 16-1: Preoperational combat checks and COMMEXs are normally not conducted to standard.

1. Units frequently have difficulty understanding the differences in and purposes for precombat checks, COMMEXs, and signal operation rehearsals.

2. Communications are not normally integrated into the brigade task force rehearsal.

3. During deployment, COMMEXs are normally ignored. If they occur, they exclude all SINCGARS FM and IHRF Radio NCSs controlling their nets.

4. Task force briefings and rehearsals do not include a complete review of the signal operations concepts or plans.

PROBLEM 16-2: Aviation company leaders too often do not conduct precombat checks and precombat inspections. Units suffer from noncompliance with unit SOPs.
RESULT: Units are often unable to perform their mission to standard because do not have the needed equipment or information.

## TECHNIQUES

1. Revise brigade task force SOPs to include essential preoperational and precombat checks of communications equipment.

2. Familiarize leaders with the purpose, application, and conduct of precombat checks, COMMEXs, and signal operation rehearsals.

3. Review the unit's timeline of events to synchronize the signal COMMEXs, rehearsals, and execution with the maneuver commander's tactical plan.

4. Units should review their precombat check and precombat inspection SOPs to ensure they are adequate and used.

5. Doctrinal references:
   - FM 7-8, ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***.
   - FM 11-32, ***Combat Net Radio (CNR) Operations***.
   - FM 11-37, ***MSE Primer for Small-Unit Leaders***.
   - FM 11-38, ***MSE System Management and Control***.