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TRENDS



NTC, 4QFY94

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
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NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER TRENDS, 4TH QUARTER, FY 94

The CALL NTC Observation Division collects these trends from the respective Observer Controller teams and compiles the results. Organized by the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS), the trends reflect both Positive Performance and Needs Emphasis based on OC assessment from the quarter.
Each of the BOS is labeled according to TRADOC Pam 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield.
Section I provides "Bulletized" statements of either Positive Performance or Needs Emphasis grouped by BOS. If you want to read more about any particular observation, refer to the BOS narratives in Section II. These narratives give more depth and where appropriate and/or available, suggestions on how to improve those
tasks needing emphasis.
Note: ( ) following bullet comment refers to page in Section II where you can find the narrative.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I: STATEMENTS

TA. 1 MANEUVER BOS
TA. 2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
TA. 3 AIR DEFENSE BOS
TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
TA. 6 MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) BOS
TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

SECTION II: NARRATIVES

Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet comments in Section I. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. The narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for reference.

TA. 1 MANEUVER BOS
TA. 2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
TA. 3 AIR DEFENSE BOS
TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
TA. 6 MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) BOS
TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

TA. 1 MANEUVER BOS

Positive Performance

* 1. Platoon Leader Crosstalk Improving (II-4)

* 1 Doctrinal Manuals: being used more during planning and preparation (II-4)

* 1.1.1.3 Aviation Maneuver Techniques (II-4)

* 1.1.1.3 Aviation Route Planning (II-4)

* 1.3.2 Defense: adjacent unit coordination at Co/Tm level (II-4)

Need Emphasis

* 1.1.1 Counter-Reconnaissance operations are inadequate to secure/protect the force (II-4,5)

* 1.1.1 MP platoon employment (II-5)

* 1.2 Actions on contact (II-5)

* 1.2.1 Direct fire planning and execution (II-5)

* 1.2.1 Conduct of boresighting (II-5)

* 1.2.1 MILES boresight and zero (II-5)

* 1.3 Problems massing combat power during movement to contact (II-6)

* 1.3 Shaping the battlefield: the deep battle (II-6)

TA. 2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

* 2.2 Positioning Observers to Support the Deep Fight (II-6)

* 2.3 Aviation Attack Battalion commander's intent for fires (II-6,7)

* 2.3 Aviation Attack Battalion fire support coordinators (II-7)

Need Emphasis

* 2. Manual Fire Direction Center (FDC) Operations (II-7)

* 2. Hasty Survey Techniques (II-7)

* 2. Battery/Platoon Operations Center (BOC/POC) Operations (II-7)

* 2. Fire Support Element (FSE) Organization (II-7)

* 2.1 Fire Support Plan - Transition From Deep to Close (II-7,8)

* 2.1.2 Aviation Units are not planning the employment of CAS (II-8)

* 2.1.3 Triggers in Defensive Operations (II-8)

* 2.2 Aviation Observers (II-8)

* 2.2.2.2 Counterfire (II-8)

* 2.3 Rehearsals (II-8,9)

* 2.3 Integration into the mission analysis (II-9)

* 2.3 Integration during the wargaming process (II-9)

* 2.3 Extraction plans for deep observers (II-9)

* 2.3 CAS not synchronized (II-9)

* 2.3 Commander's concept for fires (II-9)

* 2.3 Artillery movement plans (II-9,10)

TA. 3 AIR DEFENSE BOS

Need Emphasis

* 3. Misuse of ADA assets (II-10)

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Positive Performance

* 4. Aviation battalion staff planning process (II-16)

* 4.2.1.1 Fire Support Element Mission Analysis (II-16)

Need Emphasis

* 4.3 Brigade Fire Support Planning (II-17)

* 4.3 Co/Tm Fire Planning (II-17)

* 4.3 Aviation engagement area analysis (II-17)

* 4.3 Task force/squadron battle staff planning process (II-17)

* 4.3.1 Reconnaissance operations (II-17)

* 4.3.2 Force ratio analysis to devise courses of action (II-18)

* 4.3.2 Target Value Analysis (TVA) (II-18)

* 4.4 TOC operations timelines (II-18)

* 4.4 TOC operations decisionmaking process (II-18)

* 4.4.1 Developing a scheme of maneuver (II-18)

* 4.4.1.1 TF rehearsals (II-18)

TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

Positive Performance

* 5.1 GSR Team Equipment proficiency (II-1)

* 5.2.2 Aviation Battalion/Squadron S2 Terrain Analysis (II-1)

* 5.2.4 Platoon leader(s) role playing the enemy during Co/Tm planning and rehearsals (II-1)

* 5.3 Task Force S2 Knowledge of the Krasnovian Threat (II-1)

* 5.3 GSR Team timely, accurate reporting positively impacting R & S plans (II-1)

Need Emphasis

* 5. Too many Artillery Battalion S2s with less than 90 days in the slot prior to the rotation (II-2)

* 5. Too many Artillery Battalion S2 sections with obsolete doctrinal references, or no doctrinal references at all (II-2)

* 5.1 EW Platoons dependent on data links and computers cannot "manually" perform basic direction-finding missions (II-2).

* 5.1 GSR Team weaknesses: 1) weapon system PMCS 2) PCI map reading 3) night land navigation 4)local security 5) weak, vague SOPs. (II-2)

* 5.1.1 Poor battle tracking by Battalion S2s hinders predictive analysis (II-2)

* 5.1.2 Brigade S2s not identifying all High Value Targets (HVT), which leads to problems nominating High Payoff Targets (HPT) (II-3)

* 5.1.2 SOP (high power) jamming inappropriately used, too often with negative friendly effects and minimal enemy effect. (II-3)

* 5.3 Brigade rear area IPB never fully developed by S2s. (II-3)

* 5.3 Brigade S2 sections not producing Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) for terrain analysis. (II-3)

* 5.3 Brigade S2 produced Situation Templates (SITEMPS) are not timely; not in sufficient quantity and lack detail. (II-3)
* 5.3 Brigade S2s rarely prepare Event Templates or an Event Matrix focused on critical enemy events. (II-3,4)

TA. 6 MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) BOS

NBC

Positive Performance
* 6.3.1.2.1 Decontamination Operations (II-10)

Need Emphasis
* 6.3.1.1.4 Reaction to and detection of chemical attacks (II-11)

* 6.3.3.1 Smoke and Obscurants (II-11)

M/CM/S

Positive Performance
* 6.1 Standardization of breach lane marking (II-11)

* 6.1.1 MICLIC-tank plow breaching drill (II-11)

* 6.2 Volcano Mine System (II-11)

Need Emphasis
* 6. Engagement areas (II-12)

* 6. Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) (II-12)

* 6.1 Obstacle intelligence (II-12)

* 6.1 Combined arms breach operations (II-12)

* 6.2 FASCAM planning (II-13)

* 6.3 Survivability positions (II-13)

TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

* 7.4.3.4 Religious Support - Unit ministry communications (II 13)

Need Emphasis

* 7. Logistics estimate (II-13)

* 7. CSS rehearsals (II-14)

* 7. CSS planning and integration (II-14)

* 7. CSS plan dissemination (II-14)

* 7. Combat Trains Command Post (CP) operations (II-14)

* 7. Protecting the force (II-14)

* 7. S4/S1 - mission analysis (II-14)

* 7. Echelon training concepts (II-14)

* 7.1 Class V UBL (II-15)

* 7.3 Materiel readiness tracking (II-15)

* 7.3/7.4 Personnel and logistics requirement reporting (II-15)

* 7.3.1 Class IX management (II-15)

* 7.4.3.4 Religious support - no chaplain assistant; chaplain's with poor basic soldier skills; not integrated into plans/OPORDS; too few religious support plans in TSOP. (II-15)

* 7.4.4.2 Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) (II-15,16)

* 7.5.1.2 Heavy/light integration - use of transportation assets (II-16)

TA. 1 MANEUVER BOS

Positive Performance

1. Maneuver

*** Platoon leader crosstalk improving:** Platoon leaders are crosstalking more on Co/Tm nets during operations. For example, they are providing ranges to targets. Generally, platoon leaders are more effectively coordinating their actions with less involvement by the company commanders.

*** Doctrinal manuals:** being used more during planning and preparation, by task force staff officers, company commanders and platoon leaders.

1.1.1.3 Move through air

*** Aviation maneuver techniques:** Attached helicopter crews perform good terrain flight procedures. Individual crews are performing well; they are cognizant of dust signatures, maintaining backdrop and they make good use of shadows.

*** Aviation route planning:** Attack helicopter battalions do well at assessing the enemy air defense threat and translating that into their attack route planning. Battalion staffs, during the IPB process, assess the threat well and plan air routes which offer the maximum terrain masking.

1.3.2 Occupy terrain

*** Defense:** adjacent unit coordination at Co/Tm level: TECHNIQUE: Commanders are meeting on unit boundaries and in the engagement area to identify flanks. Further improvement would result from coordination of dead space, obstacles, and direct fire plans.

Need Emphasis

1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

*** Counter-Reconnaissance operations are inadequate to secure/protect the force:** Task Force counter-recon emphasis has diminished the overall task force security posture. Most task forces conduct a linear, picket line-like search for enemy reconnaissance elements, content to destroy some percentage of the overall enemy reconnaissance threat. Little consideration is given to the task force area of operations in depth, or to local security of task force sub-units "behind" the LD/FLOT.

PROCEDURE: Tasks forces must conduct security operations throughout the depth of their sector, including both direct and indirect fire planning. Counter-recon operations, by themselves, are rarely adequate to secure or protect the force. Security operations must also include the tactical assembly area.

*** MP platoon employment:** Brigades have limited knowledge of the doctrinal roles and capabilities of a direct support MP platoon. The MP platoon leader is normally involved in the brigade's wargaming and planning process, but he is not given mission guidance and mission priority by the brigade S3. Brigades consistently fail to include the MP platoon's mission in the brigade order. The S3 normally places the MPs under the operational control of the BSA.

1.2 Engage Enemy

*** Actions on contact:** Units generally fail to plan for all forms of enemy contact and reactions to the contact. Task force battle drills either do not exist or are not understood well enough to be executable by subordinate elements. This is also true at company/team level, where battle drills are poorly understood, practiced or rehearsed. Co/Tms continue to drive into enemy engagement areas unable to achieve or maintain tactical formations. This results in their inability to mass firepower.
TECHNIQUE: There are at least seven forms of enemy contact - visual, direct fire, indirect fire, close air support, electronic/jamming, NBC, obstacles. Units must plan for the possibility of any or all these forms of contact throughout the depth of the battlefield and at potentially critical points in the battle. Commanders must be able to "see themselves" at critical points in the battle, anticipate when and where the enemy will employ various forms of contact. This requires the plans for battle drills at these points to fight through the contact. These battle drills should be rehearsed at all echelons and then incorporated into unit SOPs.

1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire

*** Direct Fire Planning and Execution:** Co/Tms exhibit an inability to do direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive operations. Task Forces are unable to mass two-thirds or more of Co/Tm firepower in any engagement area or objective without target overkill. Fire distribution, and the shifting of fires is rarely explained or rehearsed. Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans (if they exist) are not linked. This hinders the ability of commanders to focus, shift or mass fires with sufficient control.

*** Conduct of boresighting:** Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) companies rarely boresight all vehicles to standard.
PROCEDURE: follow the procedures in FM 23-1; crews will then know to refer the nightsight and the auxiliary sights; to boresight the coax and/or the TOW. Leader supervision will insure the tasks are completed to standard.

*** MILES boresight and zero:** Boresight and zero procedures conducted in assembly areas are not done to standard. The inability of BLUFOR to hit with MILES is more indicative of a lack of understanding about MILES rather than gunnery skills.
PROCEDURE: Refer to the CALL/NTC MILES Handbook, 94-5, December, 1994 for techniques and procedures for reinforcing the doctrinal boresight and zero techniques.

1.3 Control Terrain

*** Problems massing combat power during movement to contact:** Units fight "piecemeal" and are unable to mass on the opposing force. Once making contact with the lead OPFOR unit, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. The major contributor to this problem is the march formation. Most units are spread out 7 to 10 kms in length from advance guard company to trail unit. This results in a lack of mutual support, which provides the OPFOR the opportunity to mass on individual BLUFOR companies. This ultimately leads to TF destruction.
TECHNIQUE: Design schemes of maneuver to position the elements in depth where they can maneuver effectively to destroy forces once contact is made. The wargaming process, ie. action-reaction-counterreaction, can sort out the most viable scheme of maneuver. Then conduct rehearsals, including actions on contact, to better refine what should happen when contact is made
.
*** Shaping the battle - deep battle:** Brigades normally do not plan and execute a deep fight to shape conditions for the success of the close fight. While staffs understand the concept of deep operations, they rarely are able to achieve the commander's desired effects. This is partially the result of commanders not giving realistic guidance. Another source of problems results from not considering all combat multipliers during the planning process. For example, it may not be until a rehearsal (or even during execution) that the brigade realizes the need for more combat power at a certain point in the deep battle. As the other BOS add their piece into the fight, artillery and CAS plans are adjusted. This significantly alters the original plan and "desynchronizes" the fight. The resultant piecemeal application of combat power leads to failure.
TECHNIQUE: Wargame all combat multipliers. The process must include all of the enemy and friendly critical events so that there are no major unforeseen actions necessary. This best results from starting the planning process at the decisive point and planning backwards to the initial friendly disposition.

TA. 2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

2.2 Engage Ground Targets

*** Positioning Observers to Support the Deep Fight:** Brigades generally made good use of Combat Observation Lazing Teams (COLT), scouts, and aerial observers to support deep operations. The current MTOE change to include six COLTs in heavy brigades allows brigades the flexibility to employ trained observers throughout the depth of the battlefield. Brigades also have the flexibility to echelon observers into the fight, providing for continuous coverage, better briefings, and rehearsals of teams being inserted. Concurrent refit operations are also possible. Observers inserted deep had a much greater success rate in surviving long enough to accomplish their mission, resulting in an increase in the effectiveness of deep fires, compared to the prior three quarters.

2.3 Integrate Fire Support

*** Aviation Attack Battalion commander's intent for fires:** Better articulated intent for fires results in the battalion fire support coordinator being able to better prioritize fire support and focus fire support execution at the critical time and place. Fire support coordinators are able to take the intent and produce a realistic and effective concept of fires which is integrated into the scheme of maneuver.

*** Aviation Attack Battalion fire support coordinators:** Directly involved with the S2 and S3 in the development of High Payoff Targets. The fire support coordinators are advising the commander and targeting team on the following: ability of the fire support system to defeat high payoff targets; the best means of attack; the best type of munitions to achieve the commander's desired results.

Need Emphasis

2. Fire Support

*** Manual Fire Direction Center (FDC) Operations:** FDCs are not operating manually IAW FM 6-40 or their own standing operating procedures (SOP). Many FDCs are using firing charts, TFTs, and GFTs as their means of secondary checks of their BCS data. However, they often are not conducting manual operations correctly. Many FDOs do not understand how to derive a GFT setting from BCS data, causing long delays in firing when manual data doesn't check with BCS. Targets are not drawn on the firing chart or even on a target overlay on the FDC map.

Recently, some FDOs have even set up the chart incorrectly. FDOs and FDC chiefs are not always updating their manual data for new meteorological data, resulting in an unsafe secondary check system that is often out of tolerance for range, quadrant, and deflection. BUCs are often ignored which leaves the FDC with no secondary check if BCS fails. In the alternate FDC , neither the chart operator nor the BCS operator is prepared to take over the battery in case the primary FDC is destroyed.

* **Hasty Survey Techniques:** Artillery firing battery leaders, upon occupation, have become too reliant on the PADS in determining both location and direction. In cases where PADS is not available, leaders either don't know or understand basic hasty survey techniques. These deficiencies negatively impact on battery ready to fire times.

* **Battery/Platoon Operations Center (BOC/POC) Operations:** BOCs/POCs are not operating IAW 6-50 and their own SOPs. They are not properly utilized. They are not staffed, equipped, or trained to track the tactical situation, logistics, or to command and control the battery or platoon. Additionally, BOCs are not prepared to assume fire direction responsibility when the battery FDC is destroyed. BOCs/POCs are always addressed in SOPs, but seldom implemented.

* **Fire Support Element (FSE) Organization:** FSEs are not organized to provide positive control of fires from planning to execution of the fire support plan. Brigade FSEs generally do not have all of the manuals on hand to facilitate complete fire support planning. Personnel responsibilities are not fixed prior to deploying to the field. All graphics are generally not posted on the fire support map. Threat graphics, current targeting intelligence, flight routes, all fire support coordinating measures (current and future), and friendly positions are not routinely updated.

2.1 Process Ground Targets

* **Fire Support Plan - Transition From Deep to Close**: As brigades prepare to transition from deep operations to the close fight, task force observers routinely are not in a position to observe enemy formations; targets are not planned along likely enemy avenues of approach and task force observers are not in communication with the appropriate fire support agencies to attack targets of opportunity. This is primarily due to a lack of brigade staff supervision that would ensure the task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan.

2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System

* **Aviation Units are not planning the employment of CAS:** Information critical to employing CAS is not disseminated to the aeroscout observers. Employment of CAS is not rehearsed.
PROCEDURE: FSOs must disseminate CAS call signs, frequencies, aircraft type, weapons load, Initial Point (IP) location, and IP to target time to all observers. FSOs must plan and coordinate target marking and SEAD fires. FSOs must assign primary and alternate responsibility for final control of CAS, target marking, and SEAD timing.

2.1.3 Develop Order to Fire

*** Triggers in Defensive Operations:** Problem Example - while conducting defensive operations, the task force FSNCO was ordered to emplace task force triggers for each target. The TF had no standard for these triggers, so the NCO gathered no materials. The triggers used were hasty, and developed by lazing the area beyond the target and marking azimuth and vertical angle to the target. The triggers were from 2,500 meters to 5,000 meters beyond the target. This distance did not correspond with the artillery battalion's reaction time or the time of flight..
TECHNIQUE: Recognize that existing terrain triggers are first choice and that hasty triggers can work; develop an SOP for what will be used as a physical trigger on the ground. Establish a realistic distance for the trigger, based on enemy movement rate versus our reaction time, for either total reaction time or time to fire.

2.2 Engage Ground Targets

*** Aviation Observers:** Aviation observers do not understand realistic fire mission processing times. Aviation units do not train to compute trigger points to engage a moving target at the designated intercept point. Observers also do not understand how to use fire mission processing time, time of flight and target speed to determine the distance between the trigger point and the intercept point.

2.2.2.2 Reduce Enemy Equipment Effectiveness

*** Counterfire:** Field artillery units, primarily FSOs, DS battalion S3s and S2s consistently fail to plan effectively and manage Firefinder Radar Zones.

2.3 Integrate Fire Support
*** Rehearsals:** Brigade level - fire support rehearsals generally consist of a verification of the brigade consolidated target list and an overall discussion of the scheme of fires. This is due primarily to the scheme of fires not being developed as part of the initial planning effort and not being formalized by a cooperative effort of the brigade staff.
RESULT: subordinate units do not know the overall scheme of fires until the brigade rehearsal. This causes the rehearsal to be an explanation of the scheme of fires rather than a rehearsal of them.
TECHNIQUE: Use the brigade fire support execution matrix to detail responsibilities for subordinate units and observers. As the brigade receives bottom-up refinement, ensure that task force level plans are in accordance with the brigade plan and ensure that all players rehearse their piece prior to the brigade rehearsal.

Task Force level - three types of rehearsals are used to synchronize the fire support plan and all A2C2 elements: map rehearsal; combined arms and table rehearsal; an FM fire support rehearsal. However, the FM fire support rehearsal provided only a review of the scheme of fires. Too much time is spent on issues not critical to the successful conduct of the mission. Also, shortcuts during the wargaming process make rehearsal difficult because too many unresolved issues remain in the plan.

*** Integration into the mission analysis:** TF commanders are going through the tactical decisionmaking process and into battle without knowing what fire support assets are available to support their mission. Often the FSO identifies the required information, but the S3 seldom integrates it into the mission analysis briefing.
PROCEDURE: The FSO must identify specified and implied tasks, limitations, and assets available for the mission. The FSE must assist in gathering this information in the absence of the FSO.

*** Extraction plans for deep observers:** Brigades do not plan for the successful extraction of deep observers in the event they are injured or compromises. Brigades plan the insertion of deep observers in great detail. However, very little thought is given to extracting these observers if necessary. Additionally, the died of wounds (DOW) rate for deep observers this quarter is in excess of 90%.
TECHNIQUE: Extractions must be planned in the same level of detail as insertions, and extraction must be considered first. If the extraction of teams from planned positions is not possible, then consider alternate positions or do not insert them.

*** CAS not synchronized:** CAS generally not directed against the commander's high payoff targets at the critical place and time to ensure success of the brigade's mission. Additionally, control of CAS is usually an afterthought of the brigade staff, rather than being integrated thoroughly in the brigade plan. Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs) are not planned in advance, deconflicting gun-target lines and attack aviation battle positions. SEAD plans are not usually coordinated to deconflict times in the battle.
RESULT: CAS sorties being aborted or a loss of aircraft to air defense systems.

*** Commander's concept for fires:** TF FSOs develop concepts for fire without really identifying what the commander's desired effect are and what critical tasks he wants fire support to accomplish to influence the enemy order of battle and force protection. Engagement criteria are not being established by phases of the operation to focus commanders, observers, and the artillery battalion S3/FDC. Mortars and CAS employment options are habitually being omitted.
PROCEDURE: FSOs need to be very familiar with the enemy order of battle and be able to calculate desired effects with ammunition/systems available to achieve the commander's intent. The concept should include: percentage of desired effects or the number of vehicles that will be affected in any particular enemy formation or specialty weapons (AT5 or artillery.) The commander should approve the written concept before any fire support annex being published to ensure it is correct.

*** Artillery movement plans:** Field artillery battery positions and air routes are not deconflicted.
PROCEDURE: artillery battalion S3s must plan positions around established air routes to ensure fires will not violate air routes. If positions must be placed where fires will violate air routes, an Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) must be established. FSOs must verify the deconfliction of positions with air routes during planning and rehearsals.

Aviation specific:Aviation units have difficulty clearing fires into the ground maneuver zone. Aviation elements typically receive missions to attack reserve forces; stop enemy penetrations; conduct forward screens; flank screens of ground forces. These missions often require the aviation unit to request fires into the ground maneuver zone/sector. Poor coordination of these fires result in fratricides or near fratricides.

PROCEDURE: Ground maneuver and aviation units must develop a plan to clear fires and rehearse the plan. The plan must include alternate communications methods. The plan may include permissive or restrictive fire support coordination measures, and on order boundaries to expedite fires.

TA. 3 AIR DEFENSE BOS

Need Emphasis

3. Air Defense

*** Misuse of ADA assets:** Against the advice of ADOs, commanders will insist on placing STINGER teams deep across the FLOT to protect reconnaissance assets. Or, they will direct that STINGER gunners ride in the back of infantry M2s to have survivable air defense forward. No unit has ever successfully employed air defense in either of these situations. The intent, protection from air attack has never been met. The results, however, have been consistent: ADA - dead or ineffective.

TECHNIQUE: ADOs must be more articulate in their recommendations. Air defense of deep reconnaissance assets is based on not being detected (OPSEC). It cannot be based on active air defense since a STINGER launch compromises the location. If the METT-T requires STINGERs in the back of infantry M2s, then the M2 must come under ADA command and control. Otherwise, the STINGER is trapped in an M2 without early warning and is not allowed to dismount when needed.

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Positive Performance

4. Command and Control

*** Aviation battalion staff planning process:** Staffs generally knowledgeable of staff procedures and their applications.

4.2.1.1 Analyze mission

*** Fire Support Element (FSE) mission analysis:** FSNCOs in particular are prepared to conduct mission analysis and demonstrating the ability to extract implied fire support tasks from the brigade order, The FSNCOs ability to do mission analysis ensures that the task can begin immediately, without waiting for the FSO. This facilitates the timely completion of other planning tasks, and coordination with other elements.

Need Emphasis

4.3 Determine Actions

*** Brigade fire support planning:** Various staff elements generally develop their plans in relative isolation. A lack of BOS synchronization results in the brigade targeting team failing to develop a meaningful high payoff target list; a wargame derived scheme of fires; a target list that supports the scheme of maneuver. R & S plans do not focus on generating targetable information for engagement by lethal and non-lethal means.
RESULT: no plan to link lookers with shooters in order to synchronize fires with maneuver.

*** Co/Tm fire planning:** Fire planning does not take place below TF level. The top down/bottom up targeting process was developed to ensure that one consolidated fire plan would support the scheme of maneuver at all echelons. This process is not being utilized. Higher headquarters often limit lower echelon's target allocations and TF FSOs do not allocate any targets below TF level.
RESULT: TF fire plans do not support the scheme of maneuver and duplications are not being resolved.

*** Aviation engagement area analysis:** Attack helicopter company commanders do not develop adequate direct fire planning schemes to destroy enemy forces in assigned engagement areas.
TECHNIQUE: Direct fire plans must encompass the following seven items to ensure success 1) massing of fires, both direct and indirect 2) leader control of all fires 3) fire plans understood by all soldiers 4) focusing of fires 5) distribution of direct fire 6) shifting of fires 7) rehearsal of fire plans

*** Task force/squadron battle staff planning process:** Battle staffs are not providing the commander a detailed mission analysis briefing and do not focus the wargaming effort on the critical points of the plan. Staffs consistently fail to brief assets available by platoon; amount of special equipment and munitions available; duration of combat multipliers (ie., minutes of mortar smoke, number of mines, wire available, etc.).
RESULT: lack of focus during wargaming because of an inadequate understanding of where and when these assets can be used to enhance maneuver elements ability to accomplish their mission.

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

*** Reconnaissance operations:** Enemy recon elements too often make contact and then destroy TF scouts. TF scouts seldom use bounding overwatch to provide internal security. Scouts also do not coordinate with Co/Tms performing TF-level security operations. The 10-HMMWV equipped scout platoon increases the elements stealth, but reduces survivability compared to M2 equipped scouts. With OPFOR recon elements operating from more survivable platforms (BRDM, BMP, occasionally tanks), they often choose to engage and destroy TF scouts rather than observe and report.
RESULT: special emphasis must be placed on TF scout survivability and security techniques (see FM 17-98).
TECHNIQUE: Closely integrate scouts executing R & S operations with TF security elements, and insure the availability of responsive indirect fire.

4.3.2 Develop courses of action

*** Target Value Analysis (TVA):** Typically brigades leave TVA to field artillery elements. Rarely do brigades establish a targeting team (multidisciplined team under brigade XO). No targeting team results in a failure to decide what targets must be attacked to ensure brigade mission accomplishment. When staffs fail to identify HPTs, the S2 may not acquire these targets through his R & S plan, and the FSO may not target them.

4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

*** TOC operations timelines:** TF staffs do not understand how to develop a timeline, refine it as necessary, and effectively track and adhere to the established timeline. TECHNIQUE: Time available should be analyzed to determine how much is available, how it should be allocated, and how it will affect the battle command cycle. The commander, using reverse planning, constructs a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Plan conservatively. Produce a schedule of activities that must occur. The approved schedule is incorporated into staff battle drill. Establish a tracking system to ensure critical task accomplishment IAW the schedule. Include the following events, at a minimum: 1) HHQ commitments by the command group 2) OPORD times 3) rehearsal times 4) CSS events . Schedule development should always be done in context of the 4 Ss, ie. sunlight, subordinates, supervise, simplicity.

*** TOC operations decisionmaking process:** Units significantly deviate from the doctrinal decisionmaking process. The wide range of techniques employed too often result in Tfs losing focus on designated objectives and failing to plan completely thorough the objective.
EXAMPLES: mission analysis not being conducted as an integrated battle staff:; wargaming that never reaches action-reaction- counterreaction; combining wargaming and synchronization by simply filling out a synchronization matrix.
TECHNIQUE: Regardless of the decisionmaking technique employed, detailed planning considerations, such as actions on contact and actions on the objective must not be short-circuited. See TOC operations timelines above: successful time analysis will allow the inclusion of critical planning tasks that will result in a more synchronized operation.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

*** Developing a scheme of maneuver:** TF S3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and the refinement of a COA into a scheme of maneuver. TFs normally develop a movement order and general actions on contact or actions on the objective. However, they seldom specify in detail what they want their company/teams to accomplish. Task and purpose are rarely assigned to Co/Tms. See FM 7-20 for an excellent chapter on developing a COA and scheme of maneuver.

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

*** TF rehearsals:** Actions on the objective is the critical part of a TF offensive scheme of maneuver. Units routinely lack the requisite level of detailed planning for these actions. End state is not routinely covered in the planning process. The lack of detailed planning is coupled with a failure to rehearse this part of the offensive mission.
RESULT: a lack of synchronization on the objective area. Units must include detailed planning and subsequent rehearsal for these critical tasks.

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

Positive Performance

5.1 Collect Information

*** GSR teams were fully proficient on their equipment.**

5.2.2 Process information: Evaluate Physical Environment Information

*** Aviation Battalion/Squadron S2 Terrain Analysis:** The S2s use of computer-aided terrain analysis programs, such as TERRA BASE, allow for the S2s to rapidly confirm the assessments made by employing his Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO).

5.2.4 Process information: Integrate Intelligence Information

*** Platoon leader(s) role playing the enemy during Co/Tm planning and rehearsals:** Company commanders regularly use a platoon leader to assist them with IPB.
TECHNIQUE: the commander has the platoon leader play the role of an uncooperative enemy during planning and rehearsals.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

*** Task Force S2 knowledge of the Krasnovian threat:** S2s arrive with a better, more detailed knowledge of Krasnovian doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment.
PROCEDURE: S2s must sustain their knowledge, especially Krasnovian doctrinal evolution and equipment upgrades, which result in quality SITEMPS.
TECHNIQUE: Home station battle staff training should ensure quality SITEMPS are produced and disseminated in a timely manner. Timely and accurate SITEMPS are useful throughout the planning process and are needed by both subordinate and slice commanders.

*** GSR Team timely, accurate reporting positively impacting R & S plans:** GSR teams have shown some improvement coordinating with S2s, keeping abreast of battlefield operations, briefing the current situation, and allowing time for team leaders to conduct a reconnaissance of the Area of Operations. In some cases, GSR input has added to the R & S plan, which triggers other systems in the unit.

Needs Emphasis

5. Intelligence

*** Too many Artillery Battalion S2s with less than 90 days in the slot prior to the rotation:** The current trend shows that individuals have not been in position long and have not had much training.
PROCEDURE: More emphasis needs to be placed on having trained S2s prior to arrival at the NTC. The S2s should have a minimum of 90 days in the job.

*** Too many Artillery Battalion S2 sections arrive with obsolete doctrinal references, or no doctrinal references at all.**
PROCEDURE: All field artillery battalion S2s must, at the minimum, possess and use the following manuals:

- FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (1994)

- FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army Operation and Tactics (1990)

- FM 100-2-2, The Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (1984)

- FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army Troops, Organization and Equipment (1987)

- ARTEP 34-245-10-Drill, Drills/Procedures for the Intelligence Section (1987)

5.1 Collect Information

*** EW platoons dependent on data links and computers cannot "manually" perform basic direction-finding missions:** Technology has made EW platoons dependent on data links and computers to gather lines of bearing and turn them into enemy location information. When these systems break down, the collectors and analysts do not have the requisite skills to perform basic direction-finding missions.
TECHNIQUE: Get back to basics and train for the worst-case scenario so direction-finding operations can continue when any portion of the new technology fails.

*** GSR Team weaknesses:**
PROCEDURE: Teams need to relook and beef-up unit SOPs that establish task, conditions, and standard to be performed, and also include who is responsible for what action as outlined in ARTEP 34-28810, MTP, Mission Training Plan for the GSR Platoon, and common task as outlined in STP 21-1-SMCT, Skill Level I, and STP 21-24-SMCT, Skill Level 2-4.

5.1.1 Collect information on situation

*** Poor battle tracking by battalion S2s hinders predictive analysis:** Effective battle tracking is the key to predictive analysis; it allows the S2 to confirm previously developed templates and then make an accurate assessment of the enemy's next action/reaction.
TECHNIQUE: The use of different types of icons allows the S2 section to place the SITEMP and EVENTEMPs on the map and rapidly assess the actual tactical situation. The key to this rests with effective SOPs that are rehearsed on a frequent basis to ensure that the display presented allows for a common understanding of both the templated and actual situations.

5.1.2 Collect Target Information

*** Brigade S2s are not identifying all High Value Targets (HVT), which leads to problems nominating high Payoff Targets (HPT):** Brigade S2s are not identifying all HVTs associated with each mission and templating them as they would appear on the battlefield.
TECHNIQUE: S2s need to evaluate each HVT to determine if it should be nominated as a potential HPT. This will allow the staff to determine if the targets can be ranged with friendly fire systems and in what priority they should be interdicted.
PROCEDURE: HVTs should be listed on each SITEMP and discussed by system during course of action wargaming.

*** SOP (high power) jamming inappropriately used, too often with negative friendly effects and minimal enemy effect:** SOP jamming is simply directing the maximum power output of the jammer against an enemy receiver to overpower it. It is the easiest type of electronic attack to perform, but has several disadvantages. The amount of power produced makes this method easily recognizable to the target as jamming, and allows him to quickly enact an anti-jam plan to defeat it. High power jamming can have a negative effect on friendly communications on neighboring frequencies. SOP jamming also puts out a huge signature that can be exploited by enemy EW to locate the jammer.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

*** Brigade rear area IPB never fully developed by S2s:** Brigade S2s never fully developed an IPB for the brigade's rear area. Brigade and FSB S2s do not template NAIs in the rear area. This results in an unfocused R & S effort by the MPs and no opportunities for the Mps to engage these threats prior to their objective.
TECHNIQUE: MPs must be integrated into the R & S plan for the rear area, so they can focus their reconnaissance effort. The MPs must also be informed of any threat to the rear area.

*** Brigade S2 sections not producing Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) for terrain analysis:** Instead of a MCOO, brigade intelligence sections are producing a type of terrain analysis that focuses on topographical restriction only. This approach omits many critical aspects of the terrain that have a significant impact on military operations, ie., intervisibility lines, axis of advance, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, etc.
PROCEDURE: S2s should incorporate in the IPB process sufficient time and analytical methods to produce a MCOO in a timely fashion.

*** Brigade S2s produced Situation Templates (SITEMPS) are not timely; not in sufficient quantity and lack detail:** Brigade S2s habitually enter the tactical decisionmaking process with only one SITEMP. By only submitting one to the staff planning process, S2s are not presenting the full range of enemy tactical options. The SITEMPS usually lack the necessary detail to portray the full spectrum of enemy BOSs.
PROCEDURE: Brigade S2s should produce at least two SITEMPS which show all critical enemy BOSs for every staff planning effort.

*** Brigade S2s rarely prepare Event Templates or an Event Matrix focused on critical enemy events:** Failure to prepare these products results in inadequately focused reconnaissance and surveillance plans.
PROCEDURE: the intelligence section should develop a separate overlay showing NAIs, TAIs and Time-Phased Lines (TPLs) to correctly produce an event template.
TECHNIQUE: associated with the event template is an event matrix, which ties timing, locations, critical enemy events, and NAIs together. TPLs should be 15 minutes apart instead of the typical interval of one hour. S2s should develop these products to allow the staff to build a decision-support template. They should also use the event template to track the enemy in zone and focus R & S on the NAIs where critical events are anticipated.

TA. 6 MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) BOS

NBC

Positive Performance

6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems

* Decontamination operations: Often executed in adequate time and to standard. Decon platoons know how to conduct their part of deliberate decon. Positioning of the decon platoon usually supported the scheme of maneuver. Deliberate decon sites and linkup points were identified in the OPORD.
TECHNIQUE: Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem. Rarely were specific elements, such as MPs, engineer, or medical tasked to reinforce decon operations with personnel and equipment. The key to a particularly successful decon operation was the proper augmentation and support provided by the brigade staff and the contaminated unit.

Need Emphasis

6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment

*** Reaction to and detection of chemical attacks:** Units respond slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas. Soldiers solely depend on M256 kits and place no emphasis on the use of M8/M9 paper.
TECHNIQUE: M256 kits detect only vapor hazards, while M8/M9 paper detects liquid contamination. The failure to use all detection techniques results in false readings, or no reading, which leads to unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.

6.3.3.1 Employ Physical deception

*** Smoke and obscurants:** Unless smoke is "wargamed" at the brigade level prior to assigning a task organization, smoke assets will not be usefully missioned When brigade retains control of the mechanized smoke platoon, it seldom issues a smoke plan to adjacent units or units subject to the smoke effects on the battlefield. When the smoke platoon is attached below the brigade level, a similar failure to disseminate plans occurs.
RESULT: miscued smoke missions; fratricide of smoke vehicles by BLUFOR elements not expecting friendly vehicles forward.

M/CM/S

Positive Performance

6.1 Provide Mobility

*** Standardization of breach lane marking:** Brigade unit SOPs and the engineer execution of breach lane marking are generally IAW FM 90-13-1.
PROCEDURE: All unit SOPs must have breach lane marking IAW change 1 to FM 90-13-1.

6.1.1 Breach Obstacles

*** MICLIC-tank plow breaching drill:**
TECHNIQUE: One of the most consistently effective drills is the combined use of the MICLIC and the tank plow. A MICLIC and tank wait in a covered position for the unit to achieve suppression and obscuration of the breach site. The tank plow then drives forward to the minefield, with the MICLIC close behind. Once in position, the MICLIC fires over the top of the tank plow for an explosive breach of the minefield. The tank plow then moves forward to proof the lane.

6.2 Provide Countermobility

*** Volcano Mine System:** Units make effective use of the system's rapid ability to emplace large and lethal tactical minefields during the defense. This quarter, Volcano minefields accounted for more meters of minefield frontage, with greater effect and greater OPFOR BDA than conventionally emplaced minefields.

Need Emphasis

6. M/CM/S

*** Engagement areas:** Not built in coordination with the maneuver commander, the engineer commander, and the fire support coordinator. EAs are not identified prior to positioning of obstacle belts at the brigade level. Direct fire analysis is often not conducted, and obstacles are poorly positioned to achieve the maneuver commander's intent. Construction of obstacles begins prior to the establishment of Target Reference Points (TRPs), and are not covered by direct or indirect fire.
TECHNIQUE: Engagement areas should be jointly sited on the ground with the maneuver commander, the supporting engineer and the fire support coordinator. Mini-rehearsals need to be conducted to ensure direct fire coverage of obstacles. Construct obstacles IAW FM 20-32 to ensure achievement of the maneuver commander's intent.

*** Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA):** Too many engineer company XOs do not understand the EBA process and how the planning factors relate to the task force fight.
TECHNIQUE: EBA helps the engineer visualize the terrain, enemy engineer efforts, and his own capabilities. With these planning factors, the engineer can tell the task force commander how many holes he can dig; number of breaches his sappers can perform; number of minefields sappers can emplace, etc. This information is need by the task force commander up front to assist in planning for the fight.

6.1 Provide Mobility

*** Obstacle intelligence:** Seldom received in time for brigade rehearsals. Reconnaissance elements too often do not obtain critical obstacle information, while being discovered and destroyed by the enemy. While engineers are becoming more integrated into the reconnaissance effort, they generally do not have sufficient communication equipment to provide timely intelligence. Obstacles that are breached are not always identified as NAIs or included in the brigade R & S plan.

*** Combined arms breach operations:** Brigades fail to plan deliberate breach operations even when mission analysis clearly indicates that it is appropriate. Breaching tenets are seldom addressed in planning. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction are not fully addressed in OPORDs, or during brigade or task force level rehearsals. Rehearsals often become an extension of planning because of inadequate wargaming. Few units conduct mounted combined arms breaching rehearsals. Redundancy of breaching assets and a recovery capability to remove damaged vehicles from the breach lane are seldom considered. The support force is often not positioned to suppress enemy fire. The obscuration plan is generally not synchronized with the overall breach plan. Lack of obstacle intelligence contributes to failed missions.

TECHNIQUE: The tenets of breaching (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breach organization, mass and synchronization) must be considered in all breaching operation and wargamed as part of the planning process. Combined arms breaching rehearsals must be conducted with strict attention to the breaching fundamentals: suppression, obscuration, security, reduction. Combat power must be focused at a defined point of penetration with detailed synchronization of all battlefield operating systems.

6.2 Provide Countermobility

*** FASCAM planning:** FASCAM intent and execution criteria are often not established, included in OPORDs, properly synchronized, or on a decision support matrix. Artillery is often not in position to deliver due to synchronization problems stemming from poor wargaming. Planned targets are often not executed or are executed too late to achieve the effect/intent desired. In many cases, targets are not supported with observed indirect fire.
TECHNIQUE: FASCAM targets need to be event, rather than time, driven and synchronized with the field artillery fire support and the maneuver plan. Emplacement must be tied to an observer for indirect fire support.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

*** Survivability positions:** Over 75% of vehicle fighting positions do not meet standards prescribed in FM 5-103. Some of the common problems are siting of positions; use of available terrain; spread of spoil; ramp grades; firing platform depth; width of positions. RESULT: positions not shootable or survivable.

TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

*** Religious support - unit ministry communications:** Unit ministry teams are communicating better on the battlefield. For the most part they have been issued radios. Some unit ministry teams even arrive equipped with SINGARS, which works even better. Unit ministry teams are demonstrating improvement in providing ministry to casualties on the battlefield.

Need emphasis

7. Combat Service Support

*** Logistics estimate:** Not prepared IAW 6-20-1. Units are not synchronizing CSS planning with the OPLAN.
RESULT: CSS staff officers are reacting, rather than acting to support requirements. S4s and or S1s continually operate independently from any input from the HHC commander, BMO, and the task force XO. Logistics reports are continuously submitted without on-hand quantities.
RESULT: S4s cannot track resources nor have a systematic process to collect these resource/logistic factors. S4s and S3s do not integrate the CSS plan into the wargaming process for operations. Without this integration, the CSS plan becomes unsynchronized and does not help to weight the main effort.
PROCEDURE: Battalion logisticians must gather and analyze information and prepare a logistics estimate. Participation in the wargaming process allows CSS personnel to anticipate mission requirements and establish "triggers" for resupply.

*** CSS rehearsals:** Typically turn into briefings of the maneuver and CSS plan with no focus on rehearsing the concept of support. 1SGs arrive without knowing the Co/Tm's task and purpose and cannot participate in the rehearsal. TF XOs and CSMs fail to participate in the rehearsal, as well as attached combat support elements. TFs conduct CSS rehearsals only 50% of the time because of conflicts in the TF timeline and LOGPAC operations.

*** CSS planning and integration:** TF S4s normally are not prepared to provide the TF commander and staff with the current logistical status of the TF prior to COA selection. S4s do not routinely use informal estimates or receive estimates from the key CSS leaders in the TF. Once wargaming does begin, S4s are normally not included and are left to produce the CSS plan without the benefit of BOS synchronization.
RESULT: maneuver plan that does not consider the current logistical status and a CSS plan that does not support TF maneuver.

*** CSS plan dissemination:** TF CSS plans are normally produced late; not fully disseminated; not rehearsed.
RESULT: CSS plan not understood by the CSS executors prior to the mission. TF CSS graphics are normally not ready to be issued to Co/Tm commanders at the TF OPORD brief because Tfs fail to include CSS graphics in their OPORD production system.
RESULT: S4 has difficulty disseminating the graphics prior to any CSS rehearsal. If CSS graphics are issued to Co/Tm commanders at the OPORD, a breakdown normally occurs at Co/Tm level, where either the commander fails to give the CSS graphics to the 1SG, or the 1SG fails to post them on his map.

*** Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) operations:** CTCPs are not routinely organized to function as an effective command post during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of a mission. They do not track the status of the TF as it builds combat power, nor do they maintain updated status on the supply classes at TF and Co/Tm level. During mission execution, 1SGs generally report adequate information to the CTCP. S4s do nothing with this information other than compile it into a TF report and send it higher. S4s rarely analyze information they receive to allocate resources to critical areas of the battlefield, update the key CSS leaders on TF status, or anticipate future TF CSS requirements.

*** Protecting the force:** CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense. Initial quartering party actions lack thoroughness. Base cluster defenses often are founded on poor quality fighting positions; no sector sketches; weak coordination between supporting elements.

*** S4/S1 - mission analysis:** S4s/S1s do not routinely brief assets available during the mission analysis brief to the commander. (see CSS planning and integration)

*** Echelon training concepts:** S4s continually supersede or bypass the HHC commander in the interface with the FSB.
TECHNIQUE: The S4/S1 must primarily plan for the current battle and operations forward in the task force area of operations. Any interface and coordination with the FSB is strictly a mission for the HHC commander. If S4s/S1s bypass this doctrinal relationship, their efficiency in performing current operations, and planning for future operations will be severely degraded.

7.1 Arm

*** Class V UBL:** Most TFs do not know their Class V UBL by weapon system. Vehicle commanders do not know either their unconstrained UBL or the NTC issued combat load prior to moveout day. The same lack of knowledge exists at TF and Co/Tm level. S4s typically do not compare their UBLs with the NTC combat load in order to be able to tell the TF commander if there will be a Class V problem. Class V tracking is inaccurate with no identified start point. RESULT: Class V shortages within the TF because of poor tracking and management.

7.3 Fix

*** Materiel readiness tracking:** Units have difficulty transitioning the use of ULLS, SAMS 1/2, and SARSS from garrison to a field environment. RESULT: units quickly lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperative; what parts are required; requisition status. Without an accurate and timely maintenance/repair parts management system in place, units struggle at maintaining readiness rates at or above 90% during intense operations. This quarter the EMC for M1 tanks was 71%; Bradleys were 69%.

7.3/7.4 Fix/Man the Force

*** Personnel and logistics requirement reporting:** The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness. Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements.
RESULT: CSS units having difficulty accurately determining what will be required to support the fight.

7.3.1 Distribute

*** Class IX management:** This quarter, TFs had less than 15% of their Class IX part requisitions on valid status. WHY?
1) PLL clerks and maintenance managers did not reconcile their document registers with technical supply.
2) Units did not ensure that all requisitions were immediately read into the SARSS upon delivery of the ULLS.
3) Long delays in identifying disk/formatting problems.
4) Failure to follow-up requisitions that went longer than 48 - 72 hours without a valid status.
5) Units did not create a demand history for walk-thru requisitions by manually posting them in ULLS.
6) Some PLL clerks failed to use the status disk received from technical supply to update their parts status.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

*** Religious support - no chaplain assistant; chaplains with poor basic soldier skills; not integrated into plans/OPORDS; too few religious support plans in TSOPs.**

7.4.4.2 Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC): Typical TF died of wounds (DOW) rate is seldom below 50%. By the end of a typical 14-day rotation, a TF kills itself off through improper CASEVAC three to four times. WHY? Wounded soldiers are not seen by Bn/TF medical assets in a timely manner. Tfs typically do not fix responsibility on one individual in the staff to effectively plan for CASEVAC. At times the S4 and CSM try to fix broken CASEVAC systems to no avail.

PROCEDURE: The responsibility lies with the S1 and operations officer for planning, and unit 1SGs and the medical platoon for execution. The S1 must do a casualty estimate, including where the casualties will occur and in what numbers. The medical officer should then link medical assets available with the units projected to suffer casualties.

Usually, the medical assets available fall short of the requirements to adequately treat projected casualties. Two aid stations in a Bn/TF are almost always inadequate to support a TF's combat missions. Experience shows that 15 to 20 casualties in one hour overwhelms the treatment capabilities of an aid station, which doctrinally constitutes a MASCAL situation.
TECHNIQUE: CASEVAC planning is primarily a brigade issue, because that is where the assets exist to adequately treat the casualties a TF is likely to sustain. The Bn/TF staff must, through the estimate process, articulate the necessity to push brigade medical assets forward.

7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel

*** Heavy/light integration - use of transportation assets:** Light infantry units deploy with austere CSS assets. Trucks are the lifeblood of a light TF attached to a heavy brigade. The competing demands for the trucks include: 1) move troops 2) upload and deliver all classes of supply 3) assist with CASEVAC 4) transport all CPOGs and chemical decontamination apparatus 5) deliver soldiers' A and B bags. Most light battalions attach the HMWMVs (12 ea.) from the support platoon to Co/TM 1SGs and supply sergeants.
RESULT: support platoon leader left without the assets necessary to convoy LOGPACs. Then without a plan or SOP on how to use the truck platoon, the truck are used to move troops around the battlefield. RESULT: works for the first battle, but soon leads to competing priorities, ie. trucks needed for movement of defensive barrier materiels + the need to still move soldiers, etc.
RESULT: truck platoon soon decimated by too many missions for too few trucks; maintenance losses soon mount, leaving the TF with no truck assets at all.